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Tax Systems in Transition Economies
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab
Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia

I.

INTRODUCTION

One-quarter o f the world’s population lives in countries going through the largest economic
experiment in history, the transition from centrally planned to market-based economic systems.
New market institutions coexist with the remnants o f the past economic systems, providing a
unique challenge to economic reform. The governments of countries with transitional economies
have been carrying out simultaneous reforms of legal, political, and economic institutions, thus
there is hardly any aspect of economic policy that is not or has not been on the economic
reform agenda o f countries in transition (CITs).1 Economic reforms range from the privatization
of markets to decentralization o f government finances to dismantling the regulatory influence
o f the state. In most cases restructuring CIT economic systems has brought abrupt declines in
real economic activity, considerable underemployment, and sharp cuts in government services.
It is within this difficult environment that the reform o f CIT tax systems has been taking place.
Effective reform of CIT tax policies and tax administrations has been widely recognized
as a key element to the success of the economic transition experiment. All CITs have been
involved in active tax policy reform. Some started early, in the late 1980s, and some waited
until 1993-1994. Most of the CITs have also initiated reforms of their tax administration systems,
but perhaps with less enthusiasm. This process of reforms has also brought the largest experiment
in tax policy and tax administration design in economic history.
The goal o f this chapter is to assess current tax reform in CITs. Although the process of
reform is far from over, many significant developments have already taken place and it is
already possible to learn from mistakes and early successes and to apply the knowledge to
other countries.2
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. We start in Section II by reviewing the
tax systems in centrally planned economies (CPEs).3 The vast majority of revenues came from
profit taxes, turnover taxes, and payroll taxes paid by the state enterprise sector. The enduring
legacy of tax systems under central planning is covered in Section III. Many of the failures,
problems, and idiosyncracies o f the reform efforts during the transition can be traced to the
past, where these tax systems started. The interventionist tradition of socialist planning has
been hard to shake, and so has the tradition of negotiating tax burdens or customizing the tax
system (even for individual enterprises). The fact that taxes were for the most pan hidden from
the population and that there was no system o f self-reporting or voluntary compliance but
rather an atmosphere of distrust toward the public sector, has been partly to blame for the
poor revenue performance of transition tax systems. The undeveloped tax administrations of
CPEs have been of little help. The lack o f tax administration capacity represents perhaps the
most significant o f the troubling legacies from the past.
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Section IV examines the general direction and timing for tax reform as viewed by western
economists, who at the beginning o f the transition gave advice to CIT governments in different
capacities. The fundamental question at that time was whether or not CITs should adopt full
westem-style tax systems or instead adopt transition strategies that would be simpler to adminis
ter but also more distortionary. Several factors influenced this advice, including the institutional
and administrative constraints faced by CITs, perceptions about the most appropriate timing
for different aspects o f the reform, and the lessons that could be learned from recent tax reform
efforts in both developed and developing countries. Section V examines the actual tax policies
that have been adopted by CITs over the past four to six years. These reforms have been wideranging, from the introduction of value-added taxes (VATs), excise taxes, and import levies,
to radical reform in individual and corporate income taxation. On the whole, early advice
offered by western experts was only partially heeded, and at times completely ignored, but in
the continuous process of reforms, often continuous to a fault, there has been a convergence
toward sensible tax structures. This is a judgment tempered by the fact that, as we will see,
many problems remain in individual countries and in particular taxes. Where progress has been
markedly slower is in the reform and modernization o f tax administrations. There are bigger
and deeper problems in this area of CIT tax systems, and solution will require significant
investment of resources and time. Nowadays, the successful reform of the tax system in CITs
is in most cases still compromised by antiquated and inefficient tax administrations. The last
section o f the chapter offers a summary of the main issues and some concluding thoughts.

II.

THE TAX SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST PLANNED ECONOMIES

A.

Overview

Most planned economies in Eastern Europe had tax systems based on the system o f taxation
in the Soviet Union (Bakes, 1991). Some differences existed between federal and unitary states
and also in those countries in which taxation was used early on as a tool for economic
development, such as in Poland in 1981 and Hungary in 1988. Before the transition, fiscal
revenues in CPEs came largely from three taxes placed on the state enterprise sector: the profit
tax, the turnover tax, and the payroll tax. Together these taxes accounted for almost 80 percent
of tax receipts in Czechoslovakia and Poland and about 50 percent in Hungary. In a comparison
o f tax revenue structures between CPEs and western market economies, Kodrzycki (1993)
shows that these planned economies raised almost four times more revenue than western
European nations from the enterprise profit tax, while only raising half as much from individual
income taxes.4 Taxes were levied primarily on state-owned enterprises due to the emphasis
on industrial production and the ability of the state to manage production and cash flows. The
private sector was commonly outlawed and property taxes did not exist.
According to Ickes and Slemrod (1991), central planners did not create large enterprises
compared to western economies, however, because there was an absence o f small enterprises,
tax administrators did not need to develop the capacity to tax a large number of individuals
or small enterprises. Furthermore, revenues were concentrated in the largest enterprises, so
the primary focus of the collection effort was directed at these enterprises.s Services, particularly
trade and distribution, remained underdeveloped and highly constrained. Although individual
taxation was relatively unimportant, the state played a major role in mediating between enter
prises and households through subsidies and transfers, spending at times more than half of
the gross domestic product (GDP) in this endeavor. On the other hand, administrative ceilings
on wages were, in effect, 100 percent taxes on individual income.
Although tax administration was underdeveloped in CPEs, several special features o f these
planned economies facilitated tax administration and enforcement (Tanzi, 1993; Balcerowicz and
Gelb, 1995). First, the relatively small number of taxpayers meant that the state could conduct
a reportedly 100 percent audit each year to ensure compliance (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994).
Second, restrictions on payment methods and the monopolistic role of the state banks facilitated
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administration and enforcement. Enterprises had to settle their accounts through the state
banking system, providing the state with an effective mechanism to monitor cash flows and
collect taxes. Third, the state could and often did retroactively adjust administrative procedures,
exemptions, deductions, and rates to meet its perceived revenue needs. Finally, the state served
a dual role as the owner of enterprises and as the tax collector; thus there was little opposition
to otherwise controversial tax measures.
Two major periods may be identified by taxation systems in CPEs. Under “classical
socialism,” the taxation system was for the most part just another element of the monetary
reflection of the real economy, much like the case for prices and wages (McLure, 1990). Real
resources were directly allocated through the plan and there was no need or purpose to use
taxation to affect the allocation of resources. Under what Kornai (1992) has termed “reform
socialism,” for example, after 1968 in Hungary or after 1987 in the Soviet Union, the tax system
was used as an indirect lever to collect revenues and also to influence economic decisions.
Nevertheless, reform socialism did not produce substantial changes in the turnover, payroll, or
profit tax. Any uniform or across-the-economy incentive effects from taxes tended to be muted
because of the continued ad hoc negotiated nature of most taxes. In fact, the primary method
to determine an enterprise’s tax liability was the negotiation process. Large or strategically
important enterprises were able to negotiate relatively more favorable tax liabilities than other
enterprises. The description below o f tax structures in CPEs covers both periods of classical
and reform socialism.

B.

Turnover Taxes

Turnover taxes applied mainly to consumer goods and to some services.6 They were generally
single-rate levies differentiated by commodity, and at times by type of enterprise. Turnover
taxes were collected either at the retail or wholesale level, and were often used as a mechanism
to regulate prices and to support the allocation of resources set in the plan. The tax base was
usually the differential between the controlled retail price and the producer cost, excluding
margins for wholesalers and retailers. In practice, several methods were used to calculate the
turnover tax liability: (1) as the residual from the difference between the retail and producer
prices; (2) as a fixed amount per unit; or (3) as a percentage o f the retail price. The residual
method was the most common approach. Central planners worked with a pricing system by
which the final selling price included a markup for the turnover tax, and most consumers did
not perceive the turnover tax as a separate charge. In those cases in which the controlled retail
price was less than the producer price, the turnover tax was negative, reflecting the subsidy
to the consumer. Because the government fixed most prices, some authors have rightly argued
that turnover taxes in planned socialist economies were actually not taxes but represented
predetermined margins, or a residual wedge between retail and producer prices (Tait, 1988;
Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992).

C.

Payroll and Wage (Income) Taxes

All wage and payroll taxes were collected (withheld) at the enterprise level.7 In most cases,
gross wages, including some fringe benefits, formed the base of payroll and income taxes.
Allowances or deductions from the tax base were negligible or nonexistent. Employers often
offered workers a net-of-tax wage.8 Wage policy was used to influence employee behavior,
but other policies such as fringe benefits, access to good supplies, and restrictions on residential
mobility likely had a greater impact on employee behavior. The main purpose of wage and
payroll taxes in CPEs under classical socialism appears to have been to gain flexibility in
balancing aggregate income with aggregate expenditures, otherwise income taxes could have
been eliminated and equivalent revenue collected from enterprise surpluses by paying workers
net-of-tax wages.9
Another unique feature o f CPEs was the use of taxes to regulate the size o f the wage bill
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o f individual enterprises, or more generally, the use of available funds for employee compensa
tion. First introduced by Hungary in 1968, the excess wage tax (EWT) was levied on the
differential between the actual and “normative” wage bill, where the normative wage bill was
usually defined as the product of a multiple of the minimum wage and the number o f employees.
The imposition o f an EWT was an attempt to limit the growth of the wage fund, regardless of
labor market conditions,10 however, in the prereform period the effectiveness o f the EWT was
limited because o f ad hoc exemptions, negotiated rates, and taxation of other capture of
enterprise net profits. This tax was nevertheless an important precedent, since many transitional
governments have adopted an EWT at some time during the transitional period.

D.

Profit Tax

The profit tax was by far the most important tax in the CPEs. The profit tax was used not only
to accumulate and centralize revenues but also quite often to regulate enterprise income (Bakes,
1991). While the most common elements in the tax base were gross profits and property
holdings, the tax base varied industry by industry, and in some cases enterprise by enterprise.
Deductions and exemptions were ad hoc in nature, nor was it uncommon to have differentiated
profit tax rates by industry (sometimes by enterprise). Tax rates were typically set at 50 and
60 percent. Some countries had progressive tax structures with marginal rates as high as 100
percent (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992), however, the actual liability o f the enterprise was more
often the product o f negotiation, especially for this tax, than of the actual application o f tax
law.
Since the state acted not only as tax collector but also as exclusive owner o f enterprises,
profits were actually syphoned out of enterprises in various combinations o f exacted dividends
and profit taxes. The combination was for all purposes irrelevant because the state actually
customized the final transfer of funds for each enterprise at a predetermined level.
The use o f the term p ro fit ta x in a CPE may have been quite misleading. The definition
of gross profits in a CPE was markedly different from its definition in a market economy. In
CPEs, profits were at times defined as a fixed percentage of production and distribution expenses.
Most o f the time, depreciation rules were poorly defined and capital was assumed to have an
unrealistically long life, but at the same time, allowing state-owned enterprises to deduct full
depreciation expenses would have seemed illogical since the rule was that the state provided
the initial capital without any obligation for repayment. The measurement o f the profit tax base
was further confused by attempts under reform socialism to increase the efficiency o f capital
utilization. Several CPEs followed a policy o f mandating a rate of return on the initial capital
investment, regardless o f the profitability of the enterprise."

E.

Other Income Taxes

Taxes on income other than enterprise wages and profits raised relatively little revenue in CPEs.
These were largely schedular taxes falling on wages and salaries earned in the private sector
and on professional fees and royalties. Individual income taxes were applied to performing
artists, sportsmen, writers, and some small retailers (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992). The base for
these taxes was net income adjusted for a minimum exemption, other personal allowances,
and some expenses. Tax rate schedules were highly progressive and designed to penalize
economic activity outside the state-socialized sector. Tax rates depended on how “socially
undesirable” each activity was deemed (Owens, 1991a). Kodrzycki (1993), for example, points
out that Bulgaria’s general personal income tax rate prior to reform was only 14 percent, but
the rate rose to 50 percent for artists and scholars and to 85 percent for private entrepreneurs.
Across countries, the relative importance o f individual income taxes depended, o f course,
on the importance of private (nonstate) activities. While some CPEs allowed limited private
activity in the liberal professions or small enterprises, stricter regimes controlled the activities
even o f artists, composers, and writers, and the private sector did not exist. Income from capital
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was relatively uncommon in CPEs. Those countries that permitted private property had a
schedular tax for rental income, most often with confiscatory rates. Interest income was typically
allowed only on savings accounts in state banks and on government bonds, and the government
usually controlled the rate of return that implicitly taxed savings (Mut6n, 1992).

F.

Import Taxes

Customs tariffs were imposed on goods imported from countries outside the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA). Tariff revenues typically represented a small portion of total tax
revenues since planning authorities preferred quantitative restrictions over nominal tariffs to
regulate imports. Trade within the CMEA was basically bilateral with the Soviet Union. Typically,
eastern European countries had favorable terms of trade with the Soviet Union. These countries
could import raw materials at lower than internationally competitive prices from the Soviet
Union and export manufactured goods to the Soviet Union at higher than internationally
competitive prices. The wide belief is that most CMEA prices bore little relation to international
prices or production costs, including opportunity costs. Involvement in— and dependence
on— the CMEA differed across countries, so that Bulgaria, for example, relied on the CMEA
more than Hungary. In Bulgaria, non-CMEA imports were merely 1 percent of GDP, while
taxes and subsidies from the CMEA price equalization mechanism represented 4 percent of
GDP (Bogetic and Hillman, 1994).
1.

Implicit Taxation

The existence o f implicit taxation was mentioned in the previous discussion but it is important
to address it separately. Implicit taxation in CPEs was as common as explicit taxation. Enter
prises were often allowed to mark up prices for labor and other production costs that dictated
the size o f the enterprise’s surplus. The state, as owner of the enterprise and resources, could
then capture part or all o f this surplus. The state also had the means to set input prices differently
for each economic sector and to capture any price differentials. As Kopits (1991) points out,
administratively set wages were the equivalent of income taxes implicitly set at highly progressive
rates. The implicit rates were higher the more set wages deviated from marginal productivity.
Because the state tightly controlled interest rates and capital ownership, implicit taxation was
also imposed on saving and investment throughout the economy. By rationing the supply of
consumer goods, the state directed disposable income into savings accounts, where it was
implicitly taxed due to artificially low interest rates.15

III.

THE LEGACY OF PLANNED SOCIALISM STILL PLAGUES
THE TRANSITION

The values and practices of the past tax system have dramatically defined the path of tax reform
in transition countries. Several particular features of tax systems in socialist economies need to
be highlighted to better understand where tax reform stands today in transition economies and
what difficulties lie ahead.

A.

An Interventionist’s Tradition and a High Share of the Public
Sector in GDP

The role of taxes in CPEs under classical socialism was to raise revenues for public expenditures
and support the monetary side o f the plan. This role was further expanded under reform
socialism to affect the allocation o f resources. Taxes were also used by the state to appropriate
surpluses in its role as the only owner of capital (Hogan, 1991). The multiple uses o f taxes
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reflected the state’s strong intervention and control of society14 and the economy. As we will
see below, after an initial decrease, the use o f tax laws for economic and social engineering
has been on the increase in the transition, but on a much lower scale.
On the surface, the relative size of the public sector in CPEs was high but not disproportion
ate. Kodrzycki (1993) shows that for 1988 and 1989 the average share of tax revenues to GDP
for CPEs was 44 percent, only three percentage points higher than the average in the European
Community. This figure, however, is misleading, because o f the pervasiveness of government
intervention in CPEs. Besides the different forms o f implicit taxation already discussed, govern
ments used a wide variety o f instruments to include all sorts of nontax revenues, “off-budget”
activities, and extrabudgetary funds in order to achieve planning targets and pursue government
policies. The separation between the government and nongovernment sectors was often murky.
For example, state enterprises were in many cases responsible for the provision of public
social services and capital infrastructure.15 Cross-subsidies were another major form o f hidden
government intervention. A substantial portion o f budget subsidies to particular consumer
groups, such as households or farmers, were financed by the enterprise sector without explicitly
appearing in the budget.
CITs inherited the demands of a modem social system, not very different from those in
western European economies, but with a comparatively inadequate system o f revenue collection.
Despite a strong policy emphasis on constraining fiscal spending (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1995), total public expenditures have remained high throughout the
transition, ranging between 50 and 60 percent of GDP. Keeping fiscal deficits in check has
required that transitional governments make a significant tax effort, but the causation has also
been in the other direction, from taxes to expenditures. A case in point is discussed by Aslund
(1992) for Hungary and Poland. Hungary’s high taxes largely began in the early reforms before
the demise o f communism, and the better-performing tax system allowed or induced government
to keep expenditures high. Poland, on the other hand, reformed the tax system later in transition
but drastically cut public expenditures first. Reducing the size o f the public sector in transitional
economies has had a direct influence on the quality of tax reform. Governments that have been
able to reduce the size o f the public sector have not been forced as often to implement stop
gap measures which, while perhaps bolstering collections, may sacrifice other worthwhile
objectives o f tax reform.

B.

Customized and Negotiated Taxes

The tax system o f CPEs lacked transparency and in many cases liabilities were subject to
negotiation. Taxpayers did not know what other taxpayers (even those with similar circum
stances) paid. Negotiation meant that generally there was little systematic relationship between
statutory tax bases and actual tax liabilities. Negotiation constituted part of the soft-budget
constraint facing firms and it virtually protected them from bankruptcy risk (Gray, 1991; Kopits
and Offerdal, 1994; Owens, 1991b).1 On the other hand, the policy o f keeping consumer prices
stable while continuously changing producer prices often left firms unable to pay their liabilities
immediately (Tait, 1988); this situation also required negotiations. As we saw in the discussion
of turnover and profit taxes, CPEs commonly used tax rates to determine prices and control
surplus (profit) margins o f enterprises. Bargaining and negotiation were not only about liability
but often about which taxes and subsidies firms were subject to (Newberry, 1990). Each country
used a large number o f turnover tax and profit tax rates and subsidies to achieve these objectives.
The negotiations determined how much was left to alter workers' salaries, pay for additional
capital, or undertake social expenditures in the community. This proliferation o f rates, ad hoc
exemptions, and negotiated liabilities, clearly meant that the tax systems lacked transparency.
The mixed role o f government as tax collector and as owner o f tax-paying enterprises
complicated things. As mentioned, profit taxes were also used to capture income for the state
in its role as owner o f capital resources. Actually, taxes and other charges approximating rents,
interest charges, and dividends were used interchangeably by the governments o f CPEs to raise
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public revenues.1 In addition, as owner of capital resources, the state had a free hand in levying
taxes or distributing capital income to itself retroactively.
The legacy o f customized taxes and negotiated payments has continued to limit the
efficacy of tax reform and tax administration efforts in CITs. The dual role of the state as tax
collector and owner of enterprises has been a contributing factor to poor revenue performance
in those CITs in which privatization has lagged behind. Newly established and privatized
enterprises continue to lobby the state for specific tax relief, and often choose to accrue tax
arrears as a negotiating instrument. Until recently, governments in CITs had not been able to
resist these pressures and compromised tax collections. In the case of large state enterprises
the legacy o f negotiation continues for the most part to undermine the tax reform effort in
many CITs.18 The large arrears and negotiated payments of large enterprises in the Russian
Federation have figured prominently in the international media over the past year, however,
the problem o f arrears is significantly more complex. It is discussed further in Section V.

C.

Taxes Hidden from the Population and Lack of Tradition with
Voluntary Compliance

In CPEs the populations at large were neither aware o f taxes nor had any perceptions of tax
burdens, since very few individuals actually filed tax returns or paid taxes during transactions
(Kodrzycki, 1993; Tanzi, 1994). As we have seen, the personal income tax was basically a final
tax withheld at the source by employers. Turnover taxes, collected at the distribution level,
were hidden from public view. The same was true, o f course, o f profit taxes levied on state
enterprises. The legacy of tax systems in CPEs has included a population totally unaccustomed
to paying taxes. It is not surprising that as reform progressed and the average citizen was
explicitly taxed for the first time, there was considerable taxpayer resistance and a propitiatory
environment and culture for tax evasion.

D.

Excess Burdens

Planned economies for the most part had an absence o f conventional tax distortions or excess
burdens (McLure, 1991a, b).19 In a planned economy, resources were allocated according to a
state-devised plan. Practically all decisions regarding investment were also made by the planning
agency. Enterprises were restricted to activities outlined in their founding charter. This arrange
ment left enterprises unable to react despite the nonuniform taxation o f different economic
sectors. Prices, and therefore taxes, ultimately were used only to ration demand.21’ Tax systems
also were characterized by a lack of certainty and stability, with tax rates continuously changing,
therefore enterprises, even if free to react, could not reasonably anticipate the tax system’s
impact on any activity. In short, taxes in CPEs generally had not distortionary effects because
taxpayers could make no decisions affecting them.
The absence of excess burdens was manifest in other ways. Taxation had little or no
impact on risk taking because private initiative was severely repressed. Taxation also had
minimal impact on savings. Many forms of saving or wealth were not common, partially because
they were not allowed by law. Furthermore, households were not encouraged to acquire savings
or personal wealth because both were viewed as antagonistic to socialist principles.21 The lack
o f conventional economic effects associated with taxation in market economies was perhaps
also demonstrated by the fact that tax legislation typically was viewed as less important than
other legislation on wages, prices, and production (Gandhi and Milhaljek, 1992).
There were exceptions to the absence o f excess burdens. In countries such as Hungary,
for example, early liberalization of the economy occurred and taxes began to be used as
instruments to pursue the designated goals of the economic authorities. Another exception
may have been the impact of EWTs on the labor-hoarding practices of enterprises.22
Excess burden losses, or the distortions introduced by the tax system in the economy,
are often not understood by politicians in charge o f tax reform. The lack of concern with
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efficiency issues in the tax systems o f CPEs, to a large extent justified, created an attitude toward
tax design that has come to haunt the tax reform process in the transition. As we see below,
very few CITs have been able to internalize the lesson learned elsewhere over the past two
decades that nonneutral tax measures can do much more harm than good for the efficient
allocation o f resources and for economic growth. Central planning was completely antithetical
to this general conclusion.

E.

Taxes and Income Redistribution

Equality in the distribution o f income was, at least nominally, a fundamental objective of CPEs;
however, the objective o f income distribution did not figure prominently in CPE tax policies
because the planner determined wages and income, and at the same time, private ownership
of wealth was practically nonexistent. In short, in a system in which incomes were directly
controlled, taxes were unnecessary to equalize income across individuals (Newberry, 1990;
McLure, 1991b; Owens, 1991b). Even if the policy maker explicitly wanted to pursue equity
or distributional objectives with tax policy, it would have been quite impossible. Obtaining a
distribution o f current tax burdens would not have made much sense because there was not
one common or stable set o f applicable tax rules.
It was not a well-kept secret, however, that real incomes may not have been very equally
distributed. Although wages were administratively set with small differences in rates and social
services were supposedly provided free to everyone, it was access, not income, that determined
an individual’s consumption possibilities, and access, it appears, was not at all equally distrib
uted.23
Regardless o f differences in real incomes due to differences in access, a legacy from the
past system may have been expected to be a belief in the desirability o f compressed nominal
wage and income structures. As the transition to a market economy continues, the dispersion
in nominal wages and income has invariably increased. During the transition, policy makers
and tax administrators have expressed concerns about the growing income disparity, 24 but as
we will see below, distribution objectives have played a small role in CIT tax reform efforts so
far.

F.

Undeveloped Tax Administration

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature o f tax systems in CPEs was an unsophisticated tax
administration system. The majority of tax inspectorates were local organs and were primarily
engaged in cash management (Tanzi, 1991). Tax inspectorates were organized by tax, and
inspectors were often assigned to specific enterprises. Compliance was ensured due to the
ability of the tax inspector to track cash flows through the state banking system. Auditing was
a routine adding and checking function. Since production, prices, and wages were known
parameters, audit tasks were relatively simple and there was no need to use third-party informa
tion. Tax arrears were mostly anticipated and routinely occurred when the state set the controlled
retail price below production costs. In addition, the centralization o f economic activity allowed
tax administrators to focus primarily on a small number of large enterprises.
An unsophisticated tax administration apparatus was logically rational in the institutional
environment of CPEs, however, this legacy left CITs dramatically unprepared to enforce taxes
once the institutional environment switched to that o f a market economy with private property,
multiple payment systems, and a manifold increase in the number o f taxpayers.

G.

Public Distrust in Government Institutions

An undeveloped tax enforcement apparatus was only part of the troubled legacy in tax enforce
ment. The failure o f economic policies in CPEs and the privileged status of those in power
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bred widespread cynicism among the populations. In CPEs, there was a widespread belief that
the bureaucracy was inherently corrupt (Kornai, 1990). This cynicism may have been more
pronounced in those countries in which the population felt occupied by a foreign power— the
Soviet Union. At any rate, cynicism kept pace with the rapid growth of the unofficial, or
underground, economy, in which goods and services were available outside the government's
purview.25The combination of the public’s belief in corrupt government, no history o f voluntary
taxpayer compliance, and the growing importance o f the underground economy left fertile
ground for tax evasion on transition economies (Ickes and Slemrod, 1991; Newcity, 1991).

IV.
A.

THE GENERAL DIRECTION FOR REFORM
Designing a Tax System for Transition or Adopting a Modem System

The transition to a market economy posed hard economic questions to the new governments.
In the fiscal area a fundamental question posed early on was what type o f tax structure to
adopt. The main choices were to replicate a modern tax system or to develop a tax system
that could be more optimally adapted to the peculiarities of transition econom ies.* The first
approach to tax reform in transition economies could be described as a “big-bang” approach,
putting in place a tax system patterned after those in market economies. The second approach
represented a more evolutionary or stepwise reform, gradually moving toward an ideal structure,
but in the interim being more realistic about administrative and institutional constraints and
also being concerned about the macroeconomic implications of substantial fiscal deficits that
may arise from too ambitious a pace o f reform.27
From the start o f the transition a goal shared by many CITs was to attain a modem tax
system not unlike those in Western Europe or in North America. This desire was even stronger
in those transition countries hoping to join the European Union (EU), however, also early on,
international experts warned against the dangers of mere replication o f western tax systems.
McLure (1991b) and Tanzi (1992, 1993a, 1994) give several reasons why CITs should not
duplicate western tax systems. In the first place, some western nations have poor tax policies.
Transition countries should actually learn from these mistakes, not imitate them. More important,
western economic systems characterized by stable prices and employment differed considerably
from those in CITs. Similarly, the institutional framework of western countries included complex
legislation and accounting rules that were very different from those that CITs had inherited
from the previous regime. It was clear that these differences should be reflected in the respective
tax systems. In addition, merely legislating a western tax system is very different from enforcing
it. CITs had to consider the limited capabilities o f their tax administrations vis-3-vis those in
developed nations (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994; McLure, 1995a, b). Because the institutional
background, economic structure, and administrative capabilities also differed among CITs,
expert advice emphasized the need to develop tax systems that adapt to meet the particular
needs of each country in transition (Bird, 1992; Bogetic and Hillman, 1994).

B.

Tax Reform Constraints

What type o f tax system to adopt during the transition was in part determined by the constraints
facing policy makers. The transitional environment, on average, was not conducive to radical
transformation o f the tax system. Rampant inflation, industrial decline, increasing inequality,
and a rapid increase in criminal activity all presented obstacles to the tax reform effort, but
important institutional constraints, including the necessary reduction o f the role of the state,
the decline in production among state-owned enterprises, the weakness of tax administration,
the lack of modern or western accounting practices, the lack of a tradition of voluntary compli
ance, and the threat of massive evasionary behavior overwhelmingly tipped the advice in favor
or evolutionary and country-specific tax reform efforts in transitional economies. Ignoring the
specific transitional environments would only exacerbate the anticipated problems in revenue
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performance (Hussain and Stern, 1993; Kopits and Offerdal, 1994; McLure, 1991b; Owens,
1991b; Tanzi and Shome, 1993; Shome and Escolano, 1993; Gray, 1991). On the other hand,
there was not much pressure to harmonize tax systems across CITs. If anything, their economies
were now moving apart. While competition for foreign direct investment, for example, would
impose constraints on how far a country’s tax system could deviate from the norm o f those in
neighboring transition countries, there was little pressure to strive for a uniform system across
transition economies. The only exception was the significant continuation of trade in Russia
and the other former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States). All of these countries actually
adopted an origin m eth od for the VAT for trade among themselves, and the more conventional
destin ation m ethod for trade with other countries. Those CITs desiring to enter the EU adopted
EU-style VATs, probably prematurely.
Was the advice offered by western experts heeded? Did CITs opt for interim tax systems
better adapted to their constraints rather than putting into place some carbon copy o f a model
western tax system? As we will see in Section V there were a variety o f approaches, which at
times came close to transplanting western tax systems. For the most part, however, CITs
embarked on a reform process that explicitly recognized at least some o f the constraints they
were facing.

C.

The Timing of Tax Reform

Was there a most desirable timing for the reform of tax systems in CITs? Even though there
was general consensus on the desirability of a more evolutionary approach to tax reform in
CITs, there were also risks associated with this approach. First, a slower and more evolutionary
approach to tax reform would likely make comprehensive tax reform more difficult to implement
in the future. As privatization and market reforms proceed, vested interests would emerge
independent of the state that could slow down or block fundamental reform. This problem
was evidenced, for example, by large quasi-private entities in Russia, where these vested
interests began lobbying (a continuation o f the old negotiation culture) for specific tax relief
and may have been successful in delaying important aspects of the reform. The second risk
was that continuous tax reform would deprive CITs o f the stability and certainty needed to
stimulate domestic entrepreneurship and to attract foreign investors. Continuous changes in
the tax structure would likely provide more opportunities for tax evasion and confuse tax
administrators and honest taxpayers alike (McLure, 1991a; McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and
Wallace 1997). As we will see in Section V, this risk of too much instability in the tax structure
creating an uncertain environment did actually materialize in many CITs.

D.

The Content of a Transition Tax Structure

What should be the nature o f an interim transition tax system? Tax experts were unanimous
on at least one recommendation: give first priority to the improvement and modernization of
the tax administration and to the introduction of western accounting practices. It was also
widely recognized, however, that effective administrative reform would take considerable time
to permeate the tax system. In reality, the focus and first priority in most CITs was on tax policy
reform, leaving behind, sometimes a very low priority, the reforms of the accounting system
and the modernization o f tax administration. These two issues are discussed below.
The advice o f tax experts on the substance o f a transition or interim tax structure was
based on the recognition of the different types of constraints and limitations present in the
transition. Emphasis was placed on the adoption o f taxes that could be enforceable (Ickes and
Slemrod, 1991) and those with the breadth to reduce the volatility of tax revenues (Hussain
and Stem, 1993). In this vein, Kornai (1990) advocated a tax system for Hungary that would
exclude a western-style personal income tax because attempts to enforce a personal income
tax could require the revival o f a police state. Kornai advocated a system with four main taxes:
(1) a linear consumption tax, (2) a linear payroll tax, (3) a linear profit tax, and (4) customs
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duties. McKinnon (1991), Cnossen (1991), and Hussain and Stern (1993) suggested the early
adoption o f a western-type destination-based VAT applied at a uniform rate with very few
exemptions, emphasizing the compliance advantages of a VAT.
More complete blueprints for transition tax structures were offered by McLure (1991a)
and Shome and Escolano (1993). McLure (1991a) also advocated the early development of a
VAT, because o f its relatively simpler administration vis-5-vis income taxes, and because o f its
revenue yield, potential, and stability. McLure also argued that the corporate income tax should
be introduced early in the reform to establish a more certain environment for domestic and
foreign investors, but that no attempt should be made initially to link corporate and personal
income taxation. Existing schedular individual income taxes should be kept in place, largely
withheld at the source, and should have minimum adjustments for household circumstances
McLure also advocated the introduction of excise taxes on traditional goods early in the reform
process because o f their substantial revenue potential, easy administration, and relative eco
nomic efficiency.30 Shome and Escolano’s (1993) blueprint for an interim tax structure during
the transition included, the following elements, among others: (1) a broad withholding tax on
wages, interest, and dividends; (2) extraordinary tax bases, to include an excess wage tax for
companies in the state sector; (3) multiple excise taxes on a wide range of goods and services;
(4) a rudimentary VAT implemented at the importer-manufacturer level; (5) relatively high
rates of import duties and temporary continuation of export duties; and (6) land taxes for urban
and rural land.
In all, the advice offered by western experts for designing a tax system for the transition
coincided in suggesting the early introduction o f new indirect taxes, including a VAT and
excises; the elimination o f export taxes and the lowering of import taxes; and the delayed
introduction o f a modern westem-style global income tax on individuals and, rather, the
continued schedular income taxes with withholding at the source. There was less consensus
on what form o f corporate income taxation should be introduced and how much CITs should
rely on levies on international transactions. In addition, there was little attention paid to how
to deal with the effects of inflation in the measurement of income from capital (McLure, 1991c).
As we will see in Section V, this advice was only partially heeded in the tax reform packages
adopted by CITs over the past five years.

E.

What Are the Lessons from the Western Model?

Most market economies subjected their tax systems to radical reforms during the 1980s.31 The
general tenor of these reforms has been to simplify the structures o f income taxes by flattening
rates and widening the tax base, in many cases to introduce broad-based VATs on the consump
tion o f most goods and services, and to increase excise tax rates. The broadest tax policy
objectives, not always achieved, were to reduce economic distortions, to equalize conditions
among econom ic agents, and to simplify the tax system. This worldwide reform movement
sprang up as a reaction to the belief in the 1960s and 1970s that policy makers could pick
winners and could direct economic growth in market economies by using tax policies to affect
relative prices (Messere, 1995).32 These experiences no doubt influenced the policy advice
given to CITs, although some recognized the short-run necessity of retaining distortionary and
undesirable taxation.
From the western model CITs learned what to strive for (and what to avoid) in tax reform
in the long run. The broad lines for CIT tax reforms in the long run would include: introducing
a wide-ranging global personal income tax with a simplified structure; shifting emphasis from
enterprise income taxation to personal income taxation; integrating corporate and personal
income taxes; introducing a broad-based VAT and excises on selected commodities; keeping
and enhancing traditional excise taxes; introducing some type of property tax at the subnational
level; shifting the taxation o f oil and other natural resources from production to profit bases;
eliminating levies on exports; and using a low and narrowly dispersed import tariff only for
moderate protection purposes.
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Are There Lessons from the Developing Countries’ Experiences with
Tax Reform?

Because o f significant differences in departure points of CITs and developing countries (Ed
wards, 1992; Kolodko, 1993), the immediate application o f experiences of developing countries
to tax reform in CITs is not advisable (McLure, 1992); however, there are also similarities, and
it is possible to find useful experiences.54 Many markets and tax administrations are poorly
developed in both transition and developing countries, and neither has a strong tradition of
voluntary compliance such as exists in most western market economies. Most transition econo
mies, like many developing economies, suffer from low revenues and pressing expenditure
needs. Those conditions may demand in both sets o f countries that securing tax revenue take
precedence in the short run over other desirable goals of a tax system.
Several concrete experiences with tax reform in developing countries may carry useful
lessons for CITs:
•

•

•

•

•
•

G.

Indirect taxes are typically much easier to legislate in an acceptable format and also
much easier to enforce than direct taxes. During transition, therefore, indirect taxes
may have to play a more important role in generating revenues than may be desired
in the long run (Hussain and Stern, 1993).
Property taxes and property tax administration are difficult to develop in any shape
or form that makes them significant revenue producers. Although CITs should develop
these types o f taxes, there is little promise that they will become an important source
o f revenue for subnational governments any time in the immediate future.
Successful efforts to raise revenues in developing countries have relied on widespread
withholding presumptive taxation methods and alternative minimum taxes. These
experiences are directly applicable to transition economies (Ickes and Slemrod, 1991).
Traditional excise taxes are good revenue producers and are relatively simple to
administer. Their relative good performance in developing countries should be re
peated in CITs.
It can be costly to ignore the impact o f rapid inflation in the measurement of income
from capital.
The banking system can be used successfully to facilitate certain areas of tax administra
tion such as collections and lower taxpayer compliance costs.

Development of the Tax Administration

The most important handicap for CITs early on was the lack of a tax administration system
capable o f enforcing taxes in a free market setting and generating adequate amounts of revenue.
As we have already mentioned, without exception, studies o f tax systems in transition economies
recommended strengthening and developing the tax administration apparatus independently
of the path taken for policy reform. Early work on the tax systems o f transition economies
revealed weaknesses in existing tax administration systems and their inability to enforce a
modem tax system (Bakes, 1991; Gray, 1991; Tanzi, 1991,1993). Major institutional weaknesses
of tax administrations in CITs included the following:
• A lack of familiarity with standardized treatment and homogeneous rules for all tax
payers
• A lack o f skills and experience with market-oriented taxes and tax administration
techniques, despite the fact that the existing bureaucracy was experienced
• Stagnant resources and woefully inadequate training and equipment to deal efficiently
with a large increase in the number o f taxpayers
• A lack o f adequate salaries for tax collectors to attract and retain quality personnel
and to discourage dishonest behavior
• A lack o f speed in adopting new approaches in enforcement and restructuring responsi
bilities along functional lines
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• A lack of information systems with computerized records for registration and collec
tions, and in many cases the lack of taxpayer identification systems
• A lack of manuals and techniques for effective audit of private enterprises
• A lack of understanding o f market economies
The weakness o f tax administration systems was aggravated by two factors. First, many
CITs did not have customs services or, if they did, they were understaffed and undeveloped.
When they work properly, customs services collect not only customs duties but also and more
important, VAT and excises on imported goods at points of entry. Customs services can also
provide valuable third-party information for enforcing tax compliance with domestic taxes.
Second, the effective enforcement of taxes was made more difficult by the lack of modem
business accounting standards and invoicing practices. Tax enforcement agencies were also
confronted with the fact that they needed to take over the collection functions previously
performed by state-owned banks but without having had the time to develop alternative
collection systems, such as contracting with private banks. The transformation o f the tax bases
resulting from the transition from a CPE to a market economy also presented a complication.
The viability o f large state enterprises, the traditional taxpayer in CPEs, was compromised by
increased competition, constrained demand, restructuring, and the end o f subsidies and available
cheap credit. The allegiance of regional and local tax offices of the new national tax administra
tions to the local authorities also very likely compromised collections. The collapse o f CMEA
also contributed to the decline in enterprise revenues and profit tax collections. It does not
come as a surprise that the transition reform period has been accompanied by an erosion of
tax revenues in practically all CITs (Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1995; Tanzi, 1994).
The unpreparedness of tax administration systems in CITs called for particularly cautious
approaches to those areas in which tax policy and tax administration overlap (Ickes and
Slemrod, 1991; McLure, 1995b; Tanzi, 1993; Cnossen, 1991). Special measures that have been
recommended include the following:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

V.

Elevating the status of many tax administration issues by including the most important
of them in the tax law
Keeping the number o f tax returns in the early stages o f reform low by establishing
final withholding of income taxes for most wage earners and by maintaining relatively
high exemption thresholds for business
Securing compliance o f the VAT by integrating it with the administration and enforce
ment of a business income tax
Linking when possible taxes and explicit benefits from government services
Strengthening the mechanisms of withholding at the source by business enterprises
Reducing the risk revenue instability by avoiding heavy dependence on any single
source o f revenue
Using presumptive taxation whenever the application of an ideal tax base is not
measurable and cannot be monitored

CURRENT SYSTEMS OF TAXATION

This section reviews the current systems of taxation adopted in CITs as of mid-1996 and some
of the history o f tax reforms during the transition.” The process of tax reform tends to be
different in every country and tends to have a marked impact on the final outcome. We start
this section with a description o f some of the peculiarities of the process o f tax reform in CITs
and then proceed with a description of the tax structures by main type of tax. In the last part
of the section we examine current tax administration and enforcement issues.
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The Process of Tax Reform in Transition Countries

The process for tax reform in CITs has been more complex then in other countries because of
CIT peculiarities related to what we call the “legacy” of planned socialism. Without repeating
here the details of those legacies (described in Section III), we describe several other features
that have had an impact on the process o f reform over the past five years.
First, the tax reform effort in CITs was initially hampered by finance ministries’ difficulty
in asserting their views. Traditionally, the role played by the ministry o f finance in planned
economies was secondary to that o f other ministries, such as planning or economy, and to
sectoral economic ministries. This problem has been solved slowly as the ministries o f finance
have become the dominant protagonists o f fiscal policy (Tait, 1988).
Second, tax reform in CITs necessarily involved an increase in perceived (if not effective)
tax effort. Under CPEs, we recall, most taxes were not visible in any way to taxpayers. This
made it much harder for governments to win political and popular support for tax reform. In
fact, some countries did take measures to soften the expected opposition from taxpayers to
tax reform. For example, when the new individual income tax was introduced in Poland in
1992, the government raised gross wages and pensions by amounts corresponding to the lowest
tax rate o f 20 percent. The goal was to leave after-tax income unchanged for most o f the
population (Kodrzycki, 1993).
Third, passing new legislation and enforcing it was made more difficult because of the
newfound confrontation between government and state enterprises, who earlier had acted as
partners. Due in part to the importance o f state enterprises in transition economies and attitudes
left over from planned regimes, government authorities in CITs have oscillated between extract
ing additional revenues from this sector through discriminatory taxation and providing state
enterprises with continued special tax treatment, subsidies, or condoning o f tax arrears.36
Fourth, the breakup of authority and the process o f institutional and political reform
created uncertainty among state institutions regarding who had the rights to or legal ownership
o f particular revenue sources and such assets as natural resources.37 A clear example was
provided by the fact that under the system o f “labor management,” in most state enterprises
workers could vote themselves higher wages, and thus lower taxable profits. Many CITs tried
to control the erosion of enterprise profits and assets by penalizing wage increases through
full or partial elimination o f wages from enterprise income and by introducing EWTs.38

B.

Direct Taxation

As of mid-1996, practically all CITs had the three pillars of a modern system of direct taxation:
an enterprise profit tax, an individual income tax, and a payroll or social security tax. Until
recently, it was common for many CITs not to allow the full deduction o f wages or to have
an EWT paid by enterprises. Although some western countries considered the idea of a similar
type of tax at the center o f the discussion over income policies during the 1970s, for example
the tax-based income policies (TIPs) in the United States, EWTs are exclusively a CIT phenome
non. In this section we review the current structure of direct taxes, including EWT, together
with some o f the history o f reform for these taxes during the transition years.

C.

Enterprise Profit Tax

In 1989 Hungary and Poland were the first two countries to reform the Soviet-inspired enterprise
profit tax. Many other CITs were slow in following this lead. For example, most of the Central
Asia CITs, Ukraine, and Belarus waited to start these reforms in earnest until 1994 or 1995 and
in the interim continued to use the tax structure inherited from the Soviet Union. The process
of reform for this tax has often been torturous and has not always yielded the desirable results,
as judged by the standard principles o f tax policy,39 but to be fair, the taxation o f enterprise
profits raises an array of complex issues for which there are no best-practice or standard
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answers. Most western tax systems continue to struggle with some of these issues. As we see
below, the approaches followed in CITs to the taxation of enterprise profits are also quite
diverse. Perhaps the most important difference with current western tax systems is the CIT
predisposition to use the tax code to promote or guide certain types o f investment activities
through either tax incentives and holidays or differential tax rates, however, even here the
recent trend among CITs has been to follow the lead o f western tax systems to provide a more
level field for business activities across all sectors of the economy (OECD, 1995b).
1.

T ax Rates

The general rates o f the enterprise profit tax are moderate and often below those in western
tax systems (Table 1). They range from 20 percent (Georgia) to 50 percent (Tajikistan).40 Out
o f twenty-five CITs, five have a rate o f 25 percent and another five have a rate o f 30 percent.
Russia’s current general rate is 35 percent.41 These are significant changes from the enterprise
profit taxes in CPEs, which had rates as high as 85 percent. The trend over the past several
years in most CITs has been toward lower tax rates.
With the exception o f the Baltic countries, all the CITs in the newly independent states
(NIS) have a separate and higher rate for banks and insurance companies, up to 55 percent in
Ukraine. Other special treatments include lower rates for agricultural producers, small busi
nesses, and joint ventures, and higher rates for gambling and some intermediary activities.
2.

T ax B a se s

The tax base o f the enterprise income tax is typically calculated as the difference between
taxable incomes and allowable expenses. One country, Croatia, significantly deviates from this
rule. In Croatia the tax base is the difference in the net worth of the firm at the beginning and
the end of the year, adjusted for several factors such as new capital contributions and excessive
management payments (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995; Schmidt, Wissel and Stockier, 1996; MartinezVazquez and Boex, 1996a).
The calculation of the tax base o f the enterprise profit tax in CITs has undergone profound
transformations since 1991. Early on, it was common in many CITs to limit all kinds of deductions
from enterprise revenues, including wages, capital depreciation, and interest. For these reasons
the tax was known in countries such as Russia as the enterprise in com e (rather than profit)
tax. Most CITs currently allow the deduction o f costs incurred in the generation o f taxable
income, however, many of the CITs still disallow the deduction o f important expenses, which
in western tax systems are regarded as perfectly legitimate deductions. For example, interest
costs on long-term loans are not deductible in Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan;
and Moldova’s enterprise income tax does not allow the deduction of labor costs for banks
and insurance companies (Table 1).
A more common occurrence is to limit the deduction of certain kinds of costs incurred
in the production of income.43 In many instances these limitations go beyond sensible administra
tive measures (e.g., entertainment and travel expenses). Production and operation expenses
that are still subject to limitations include labor costs, interest costs, expenses in research and
development or environmental protection, and advertising (Table 1). Other awkward limitations
exist on the deductibility o f production expenses. For example, Bulgaria limits the deduction
for capital expenses up to the level o f profits in a particular year, thus enterprises with losses
or zero profits are not granted a capital expenditure allowance in that year. These measures
surely affect enterprise decisions on the type o f technology or method of production used. The
created distortions unnecessarily violate the tax policy principle o f economic neutrality and
add to the overall burden of taxation.
The norm among CITs is to allow the carry-forward of losses for a period of five years;
however, in some countries, such as in the Central Asia group, carry-forward provisions are
limited to joint foreign ventures. Out of twenty-five countries, five have no carry-forward
provision (Table l).44 None o f the CIT enterprise profit taxes provides for the carry back of
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Table 1

Enterprise Profit Tax

Basic rate

Albania

30%

Armenia

12-30%
progressive

Azerbijan

25-35%
progressive
35% after
500,000
rubles

Belarus

30%

Bulgaria

40%

Croatia

25%

Czech
Republic

39%

Other rates
40% tourist activi
ties; 50% min
eral/energy ex
traction
45% banks/insur
ance; 70% gam
bling

Limits on deductions
Entertainment expenses; interest
expenses3

Employee fringe
benefits

3 (0 )

Environmental protection; R&D

Long-term bank
loan interest

5 (0) for
joint ventures
onlyc

Long-term bank
loan interest ex
cept joint ven
tures;' expenses
not specified in
the law
Employee bonuses;
housing allow
ances; long-term
bank loan in
terest
Enterprise reserves

5 (0) for
joint ventures
only'

Bonuses; excessive
interest
Entertainment ex
penses

5(0)

Some labor costs;
45% banks/insur
environmental
ance; 70% gam
protection; R&D
bling; 15—45% co
operatives

15% small business;
44% banks/insur
ance; 60% gam
bling; 50-80%
auctions/leasing
30% small business;
50% banks/insur
ance
None
25% investment,
share, pension
funds

Loss carry
forward (back)
in years

Labor costs; envi
ronmental pro
tection; R&D

Medical care inter
est; Capital ex
penses'
Entertainment and
travel expenses
Lease payments; ex
cessive interest;
travel expenses

Tax incentives
Special activity rein
vestment activi
ties
Small business1"
2- or 3-year new
businesses ex
emption; in
creased pro
duction'1
2-year geographical
exemption; in
creased produc
tion;11small busi-

Foreign investor
incentives
None

2-year tax exemp
tion; 50%' or
70%' of basic rate
thereafter
2-year tax exemp
tion;' 3-year ex
emption with
10% rate if lo
cated in moun
tain region
3-year tax exemp
tion'

None

Reinvestment activi
ties; profits used
for social activi
ties tax exempt

5 (0)

Some agricultural
production tax
exempt
None

None

5-year exemption
for certain energy
producers

None

7 (0 )

None

Martinez-Vazquez and Mc Nab

Country

Nondeductible
expenses

Estonia

26%

Georgia

20%

Kyrgyzstan

35%

Latvia

25%

10% agriculture;
45% foreign
branch offices
45% banks; 55% in
surance; 70%
gambling

5(0)

None

No information

5 (0 )

2-year exemption,
1-year exemption,
followed by 50%
with 50% rate re
rate reduction for
duction in follow
4 years;® 2-year
ing 2 years; 10exemption ;h
100% allowances
100% foreignfor profits rein
owned firms ex
vested in indus
empt until initial
trial equipment,
investment re
technology, and
couped
certain social proj
ects
Accelerated depreci 85% liability reduc
tion for offshore
ation; interest al
companies
lowance for in
vestment
None
20% basic rate if
registered in free
economic zone
30% basic rate on
10% basic rate on
joint ventures'
reinvested profits

Excessive interest;
lease payments;
consultancy fees

Nonentrepreneurial expenses

Interest payments

Exchange market
losses; private ex
penses
Expenses not al
lowed for in the
law

Environmental pro
tection; social ser
vice labor costs

Bank interest; bad
debts

None

Gifts

Unlimited in
first 3 years;
5 (0 )
thereafter
5(0)

5 (0) for
joint ventures
only;'
1 (0)
otherwise,
within limits
5 (0 )

Small businesses
pay 80% of calcu
lated tax

T ax S ystems in T ransition E conomies

Kazakstan

18% declared
profits; 23%
distributed
profits
30%

Hungary

Fixed asset costs;
4% general insur
entertainment
ance; 1% life,
expenses
pension, health
insurance
No information
0% agricultural ac
tivities; 10% in
dustrial/manu
facturing; 35%
banks; 60% enter
tainment; 70%
gambling

None
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Table 1 Continued

Country

Basic rate

Lithuania

29%

Moldova

15-32%
progressive

Nondeductible
expenses

Loss carry
forward (back)
in years

Other rates

Limits on deductions

10% agriculture

Donations to cul
tural, social funds

Expenses not re
lated to produc
tive activity

None

Capital/profit rein
vestment; small
business start-up
allowance1

10-50% cooperatives; 25% insur
ance; 40% banks;
70% excess
profits

No information

Labor costs for
banks and insur
ance companies

None

Advertising; R&D

Director’s fees
Expenses not re
lated to activity
and not specifi
cally allowed
Interest on inter
company loans;
voluntary prop
erty insurance;
certain em
ployee benefits,
including bo
nuses

Maximum basic
rate of 30% and
accelerated de
preciation in free
trade zones; in
vestment deduct
ibility in certain
sectors
Geographic invest
ment allowance
None

Poland

40%

Romania

38%

25% agriculture;
60% gambling

Interest expenses;
advertising; pub
lic relations

Russia

35%

43% banks/insurance intermedi
ary activities; 70%
video rental; 90%
gambling

Bank interest;
travel/entertain
ment; certain ad
vertising and mar
keting expenses;
R&D; charitable
donations

3 (0) in equal
installments
5 (0) for large
enterprises
3 (0) for small
enterprises
5 (0)

Tax incentives

Small business;11In
vestment for
expansion of pro
duction for cer
tain sectors; 50%
rate reduction for
banks/insuranee
companies in ag
ricultural section1

Foreign investor
incentives
3-year exemption
and 50% reduc
tion for next 3
years for joint
venture0
1-6 year exemption
for qualifying
joint ventures'

None
5-year tax exemp
tion for exporting
joint ventures
2-year federal tax
exemption; 75%
rate reduction in
third year, 50%
rate reduction in
fourth year”

Slovak
Republic

40%

Serbia

25%

Slovenia

25%

Tajikistan

50%

Turkmenistan

25%

Travel expenses;
lease payments;
interest in excess
of debt/equity ra
tio; advertising
Ecological ex
penses; promo
tional expenses

Entertainment ex
penses; director’s
remuneration

5 (0 )

Fines and penalties

5 (0 )

Interest on overdue
accounts

5 (0 )

Lump-sum em
ployee pay
ments; Long-term
loan interest

5 (0) for joint
ventures

25% farms, small en
terprises; 55%
bank/insurance

Labor costs; enter
tainment ex 
penses
Labor costs; envi
ronmental pro
tection; R&D

30% small business,
banks/insurance;
60% gambling

Excessive labor
costs;1environ
mental protection

Expenses not specif
ically allowed in
the law

None

5 years only
for first
3 years
of costs
None

Ukraine

30%

55% banks/insur
ance; 60% gamling

Advertising; busi
ness trips and
meetings

Expenses not specif
ically allowed in
the law

Uzbekistan

37%

3-20% agriculture;
35% banks/insur
ance; 60% gam
bling

Advertising; travel
expenses; R&D;
training expenses

Interest on overdue
and deferred
loans

Certain energy pro None
ducers exempt
for 6 years; spe
cial deductions
for farmers
Reinvested profit al 5-year tax reduction
equal to share of
lowance; small
foreign partici
business re
pation (FP) if FP
duced rate; 3/1year exemption
> 10%
for new enter
prises"
None
New employee al
lowance; Invest
ment deductions0
30% basic rate for
2-year rural small
joint ventures; 2enterprise ex
year exemption
emption; ag
for most enter
ricultural reduced
prises
rate
Exempt from taxes
1-year exemption
until recoup ini
and 50% rate re
tial investment
duction for cer
tain producers’1
Accelerated depreci Offshore compa
nies located in
ation on active
Ukraine tax-ex
production assets
empt
2-5 year exemp
Reinvested profits;
tion, depending
reduced rate or
on sector
2-year tax exemptionq
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Table 1 Footnotes
'Interest expenses are not deductible if the interest rate exceeds rates approved by the Central Bank of Albania.
bAlbania provides tax incentives for enterprises engaged in production (excluding oil and gas) for more than 10 years, starting 4 years after initial production. This is a 60% tax
credit for all taxes paid on profits reinvested in the production sector. Reductions are also available for small business.
'Joint ventures with foreign participation of greater than 30% qualify for this incentive.
^Typically, profit resulting from increased production of all or some goods may be exempt or taxed at a lower rate.
'Joint ventures with foreign participation of greater than 50% minimum investment of 5100,000 qualify for this incentive.
'Capital expenditures up to the amount of annual profits are deductible if purchased assets are used for at least 1 year after costs have been deducted.
‘Joint ventures with foreign participation (FP) greater than 20% minimum investment of $100,000, and domestic investment greater than 20% qualify for this incentive.
hJoint ventures with FP greater than 20% minimum investment of $100,000 and domestic investment less than 20% qualify for this incentive.
In most cases, excessive labor costs are defined as labor costs exceeding the normative wage fund, which is equal to the product of the size of the labor force and a multiple of
the minimum wage.
'Small enterprises pay 70% of the basic rate in the first 2 years and 50% of the basic rate in the third year after start-up.
'‘Two-year exemption, followed by 25% of basic rate in the third year, and 50% of basic rate in the fourth year, if greater than 70% of turnover is related to production or processing
of agricultural, consumer, construction materials, or engaged in construction activities.
'To qualify, more than 50% of total credits/policies must be within the agricultural sector.
“Joint ventures with more than 30% foreign participation and minimum investment of $10 million qualify for this incentive.
“Enterprise are granted an allowance for profits reinvested in fixed assets. Most enterprises qualify for the 3-year exemption; bank and insurance companies qualify for the 1-year
exemption.
“20% of investments in fixed tangible assets and intangible long-term assets are deductible; 30% of gross wages of newly employed persons and trainees are deductible for 12
months.
'“Rate reduction applies to enterprises engaged in agricultural production, production of consumer goods, and construction enterprises.
’Companies not engaged in distribution, retail, wholesale, or intermediary activities are taxed at 25% of basic rate in the first year, 50% o f basic rate in the second year. Exemption
of two years applies to farms, consumers, and construction enterprises. 30% of profits reinvested or used to repay productive investments in foodstuffs, construction materials,
and consumer goods are deductible.
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
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losses. This latter measure is probably justified at the current stage of development of tax
administration in CITs. Carry-back provisions are difficult to implement because they require
reopening returns for prior years.
The vast majority o f the CIT enterprise profit taxes do not allow for explicit partial or
comprehensive ( J la Chile or Israel) adjustments for inflation.45 Croatia allows for a partial
adjustment for inflation by granting enterprises a “protective interest deduction” equal to the
enterprise's equity capital times the sum o f inflation rate in the manufacturing sector and a 3
percent real rate of return.46
Because inflation rates have moderated considerably in the past one or two years in most
CITs, the distortions associated with inflation in such areas as the depreciation of assets (at
historical costs) or the deduction of full interest costs have decreased in importance. Many CITs
have dealt with the problem associated with inflation in ways similar to those often used in
western countries. These include allowing a one-time discretionary revaluation o f assets, allow
ing first in-first out (FIFO) methods for the valuation of inventories,47 and in fewer cases,
introducing some form o f accelerated depreciation. The most common methods of depreciation
allowed in CITs are straight-line and declining balance methods at historic costs.48 The relative
merits of different approaches to the measurement of income from capital in CITs are discussed
in McLure (1991c).

3.

T ax Incentives and Holidays

This is an area riddled with problems. Most of the enterprise profit taxes in CITs remain saddled
with special treatments and provisions.49These measures have contributed to lower collections,
directly and indirectly, by facilitating evasion and avoidance behavior, have produced an
increasing perception of unfairness o f the tax system, and have added to the distortions in the
allocation of resources in CIT economies. Perhaps because CITs have not yet shared the failed
experience o f western and developing economies in trying to use the tax system for economic
and social engineering50 they were bound to repeat some of the same mistakes. A legacy of
intervention in the economic system for social and political reasons in these countries has
contributed to this interventionist phase, but in fact the worst may be over. During the past
years in several CITs there has been a significant reduction in the scope and level of tax
incentives granted through the enterprise profit tax.51
Tax incentives and holidays are provided by just about every CIT to both domestic and
foreign enterprises. The latter usually have additional, more generous, provisions. The wide
range of incentives granted to all enterprises includes reinvestment allowances as a share of
profits (at times up to 100 percent),52 investments in particular sectors (most often agricultural
production, but also construction and mineral extraction), and investments in particular areas
(e.g., those with high unemployment, “free trade zones,” and mountainous or isolated areas).
Often these incentives are granted at the discretion of the tax and economic authorities. Oiher
incentives are available for small firms, for increases in production, for first owners of capital,
for hiring new employees, for privatized firms, and for exporters. In addition to those incentives
legislated in the tax laws, some CITs have followed in the worst tradition of many developing
countries of negotiating customized tax incentives or granting tax relief to individual enterprises
by special decree.54
Since early in the transition, many CITs have provided specific incentives restricted to
foreign investors, but here also there has been a significant retrenchment from the more generous
early practices. In fact, several CITs have eliminated all special incentives exclusively designed
for foreign investors.55 In those CITs in which special provisions remain, to qualify for tax
incentives foreign investors are typically required to have a participation of at least 30 percent
in the business and often a minimum absolute dollar amount of investment. The tax incentive
typically exempts profits or taxes them at a reduced rate for a period of two to five years.
For example, in the Russian Federation, foreign investors engaged in production activities with
a business participation rate above 30 percent and with a minimum investment of $10 million
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qualify for a two-year exemption from the enterprise income tax and for a tax rate reduction
o f 75 percent in the third year and 50 percent in the fourth year (Table 1).
4.

T reatm ent of Foreign Incom e

Special tax incentives have been justified by the need o f CITs to attract foreign investment.57
Tax incentives are just part o f the more general issue for CITs of how to tax income made by
foreigners.58 This question requires taking into account the (investor’s) home country tax treat
ment o f incomes generated abroad and perhaps also the treatment of other countries in transition
that are potential competitors for foreign investment.59 This complex issue still waits to be
addressed in a well-balanced manner in CITs.
Most CITs treat foreign companies as domestic legal entities when they have been regis
tered or incorporated in the country. Also, most of the CITs levy a withholding tax on royalties,
dividends, and interest paid to nonresident enterprises at moderate rates, ranging from 10 to
25 percent.60

D.

Excess Wage Taxes

Excess wage taxes o f various forms have been common levies peculiar to CITs.61 These countries
introduced excess wage taxation for a variety o f reasons. First, there was a perception that
state enterprise managers would use reconversion and privatization as a means to decapitalize
the firm. The fear was that enterprise managers under pressure from labor would divert capital
to the wage fund. With relaxed or no price constraints enforced by national planning, enterprise
managers can buy industrial peace and perhaps personal gain by awarding excessive wage
payments at the expense o f capital (Tait and Erbas, 1995). Second, in the absence of profitseeking behavior in private firms, there was no effective constraint on wage demands by
labor. The EWT was designed to penalize “excessive” wage increases and prevent inflationary
pressures. Finally, the growth in income disparity was deemed to be an undesired result of the
transition process, and by limiting wage growth governments felt that they could limit the
increasing disparity.
However, EWTs have been poor solutions to the more central problems of eliminating
labor management and imposing stricter budget constraints on enterprises (McLure, 1991a). In
addition, EWTs can discourage innovation and productivity growth by preventing firms from
raising wages to attract and retain well-skilled, motivated workers or by penalizing those firms
that have a more productive and better trained workforce (Shome and Escolano, 1993; Jackman,
1994).
The EWTs take different forms. In some cases, all wages (Uzbekistan) or part of the
wages (Azerbijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) are not allowed
as deductions and therefore are included in the base of the enterprise profits tax. Other countries,
such as Poland, had a separate levy on excess wages. Although the trend has been for the
elimination of EWTs, there has been hesitation. Kazakstan introduced a new EWT in 1996
shortly after the old EWT had been eliminated, however, this new EWT was never implemented
and has now been repealed.62
An EWT can generate significant revenues by widening the base of the standard enterprise
profits tax.63 Although sizeable EWT revenues have been collected in some CITs, on average
revenues have been limited, in part due to the increase in budget arrears. Tait and Erbas (1995)
argue that a relatively small increase in the standard enterprise profits tax would generate
sufficient revenue to more than match the revenue potential of most EWTs. In practice, EWTs
are limited but did not stop state enterprise managers from granting exorbitant or inflationary
wage increases. The endurance of EWTs is apparent because they can generate some revenue,
and more important, because they are relatively easy to administer in the state enterprise sector.
Countries that still continue to use an EWT have been generally less advanced in the privatization
o f the state enterprise sector, however, the effective administration of the EWT may be less
dependent on the degree o f privatization than on the average size o f enterprises.
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Personal Income Tax

The pioneer in the reform o f individual income taxes was also Hungary, which introduced a
broad-based individual income tax in 1988. This lead was followed by Poland, which introduced
a global income tax in substitution for the previous schedular taxes in 1992. Most former soviet
union (FSU) countries just continued using the taxes inherited from the Soviet Union. The big
avalanche o f reform of individual income taxes in other CITs came in 1993 and 1994. Most
CITs have continued to reform and fine tune their individual income taxes up to the present
time, however.
In designing new individual income taxes, CITs have had several important decisions to
make (McLure, 1991a). Among the two most important decisions were the choice o f tax base,
income or consumption, and the overall structure of the tax, global (lumping all sources of
income in one single base) or schedular (allowing for different bases and perhaps rates,
depending on the source o f income). Other important decisions included the partial or full
integration o f enterprise and individual income taxes, rate structure, inflation adjustment of
monetary figures (exemptions and rate structure), use of indexation for inflation for the measure
ment o f income, and the use o f personal and family exemptions and itemized deductions to
arrive at a taxable base.
1.

Structure

As in the case o f most income taxes in western and developing countries, CITs have adopted
neither a full income tax base nor a consumption base, but rather a hybrid base with features
from both approaches (McLure and Zodrow, 1996a; McLure, 1992a). To the extent that a
consumption-based income tax provides more incentives to savings and investment, the choice
of a consumption base would be more desirable in CITs because o f their much higher needs
for national savings and capital accumulation.61 Four CITs (Croatia, Albania, Latvia, and Lithuania)
have adopted close to a consumption-based income tax by exempting dividends and all interest
income (Table 2).M This treatment is the equivalent o f a consumption tax with nonregistered
accounts, however, none o f these four countries has adopted the complement of an enterprise
cash-flow tax.66 As discussed below, many other CITs tax different forms o f capital income
more lightly than labor income.
The aim o f most CITs has been to adopt a global personal income tax similar to that
existing in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, in
which tax is paid on global income with credit for taxes withheld at the source and estimated
tax payments. As is the case in developing countries, however, the lack of a well-developed
tax administration in CITs clearly calls for a more significant role for withholding taxes and for
the preservation of a schedular structure of income taxes to reduce the number of returns
processed by the tax administration.67 There will be at least a temporary trade-off between what
is administratively feasible and other desirable goals of tax policy. A schedular structure typically
sacrifices horizontal and vertical equity and introduces economic distortions by treating income
from different sources differently. On the other hand, it is much easier to administer and enforce
effectively.
Almost without exception CITs eliminated all previous schedular taxes on labor or employ
ment income, and all o f these incomes are now taxed in a single base, however, many o f these
countries also use schedular final withholding taxes for salaried employees who have no other
sources o f income and whose salaries are subject to withholding. Also common are schedular
final withholding taxes for several forms o f capital income, when these are not exempt/*
2.

T ax B a se

The base o f the individual income tax in CITs includes all types of labor and employment
income. CITs with global individual income taxes also include income from capital and other
sources that are not exempt (Table 2),69 but as mentioned above, many other CITs use schedular
final withholding taxes for some forms of capital income.
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Table 2

Personal Income Tax and Social Security Contributions

Albania
Armenia

40
30

Azerbijan

40

Belarus

40

Bulgaria

50

Croatia

35

Czech Re
public

40

Estonia

26

Georgia

20

Taxation of
dividends

Excepted income
(minimum ownership period)
Capital gains, state pensions
Capital gains on private prop
erty, state pensions
Capital gains on private prop
erty, all pensions
All gains on private property, al
imony, state pensions
All pensions, severance pay
ments, royalties received
from abroad
Immovable property (3 years),
all interest, dividends, capped
amount of all pensions
Primary home (2 years), other
immovable property (5
years), share in joint stock
companies (3 months), other
movable property, alimony
Private dwellings (2 years),
other private property, land
and building received under
property reforms, dividends,
state pensions
All gains on private property,
sale of agricultural produce,
severance and compensation
payments, all pensions

Treatment of interest

Employer
social security
contribution (%)

Employee
social security
contribution (%)
10

None
Personal income tax

None
Personal income tax

32.5
37

Personal income tax;
prepayment withheld
at source
15% final withholding

Personal income tax; in
terest on savings and
securities exempt
Exempt

37

Personal income tax;
prepayment withheld
at source
Exempt

Exempt

42-57
(20% expatriates)

Exempt

19.75

23.85

25% final withholding

15% interest on savings;
25% interest on securi
ties

35

12.5

26%

10% final withholding
on bank interest; 26%
creditable withhold
ing on nonbank in
terest
Personal income tax;
domestic bank inter
est exempt

33

Personal income tax

1

36

37

Martinez -Vazquez and Mc Nab

Country

Highest
rate (%)

Hungary

48

Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan

40
40

25
10

Lithuania

33

Moldovia

50

Poland

45

Romania

60

Russia

35

Serbia

35

10% final withholding

Exempt

15% final withholding
15% final withholding

15% final withholding
Exempt

32
37

Exempt

Exempt

37

1

Exempt

Exempt

30

1

Personal income tax

Personal income tax

39

1

20% final withholding

20% final withholding
on loans; interest on
savings and securities
exempt
Exempt

48.5

0

20-50

4

10% final withholding

47
(8.5% expatriate)

11.5
(1.5% expatriate)

Personal income tax

Domestic bank interest
exempt

38.5

1

90% taxed at personal
income tax rates

Personal income tax;
20% advance with
holding at source

23.8

23.8
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Latvia

Primary home (5 years), all pen
sions, interest and capital
gains on certain bonds, ali
mony
Sale of private residence
Gains on private properly, rein
vested dividend income, state
pensions
Sale on any personal property,
dividends, alimony, state pen
sions
Sale of any personal property,
dividends, state pensions
Gains on private property, all
pensions, inheritance and
gifts, alimony, all pensions
Capital gains used for primary
home purchase; gains on cer
tain securities, bonds, and in
terest-bearing securities
Gains from sale of any personal
property, all pensions
All pensions, gains not exceed
5000 multiple wages for im
movable personal property,
1000 multiple wages for all
other property
Immovable property (10 years),
sale of immovable property if
reinvested in dwelling, most
gains from movable property,
all pensions
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Continued

Taxation of
dividends

Excepted income
(minimum ownership period)

Slovak
Republic

42

Slovenia

50

Primary home (5 years), other
immovable property (5
years), share in certain enti
ties (5 years), other moveable
property (7 years)
Real estate (3 years); gains on
securities until 1/1/97

Tajikistan

40

Gains on capital assets, state
pensions

8

Interest from domestic banks,
state pensions

15% final withholding

Gains from sale of personal
property, premium bonds, ali
mony, state and voluntary in
surance pensions
Gains from sale of personal
property; interest from domes
tic banks, premium bonds,
state securities, alimony, state
pensions

15% prepayment with
held at the source

Country

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

40

Uzbekistan

40

Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).

Treatment of interest

Employer
social security
contribution (%)

Employee
social security
contribution (%)

15% final withholding

15% final withholding
on savings interest

38

12

60% taxed at personal
income tax rate; pre
payment withheld at
source
Personal income tax;
prepayment withheld
at source

Personal income tax;
prepayment withheld
at source

19.37

22.1

Personal income tax; do
mestic bank interest
exempt; prepayment
withheld at source
15% final withholding;
domestic bank inter
est exempt
Exempt

38

0

30

1

39

1

40

3

Personal income tax;
prepayment withheld
at source

Personal income tax; do
mestic bank interest
exempt; prepayment
withheld at source

Martinez -Vazquez and Mc Nab

Highest
rate (%)
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The definition of employment income is wide.70 An almost universal feature of CITs is
the attempt to widen the individual income tax base to include fringe benefits, bonuses,
allowances, and other forms noncash income. These forms o f compensation appear to be more
common in transition economies than in market economies,’ 1 however, it is unclear how
effective the taxation o f fringe benefits has been. These forms of compensation are notoriously
hard to tax even in countries with the most advanced tax administration systems. One way to
ensure wider taxation of fringe benefits is to tax them at the company level. So far, only Hungary
has used this approach among CITs.72 Still, a simpler administrative approach to this issue is
to disallow companies a deduction for those fringe benefits not taxed at the individual level.'’
Practically all CITs exempt income from pensions.74 As discussed elsewhere in this section,
many CITs also exempt interest income, and fewer of them exempt dividends and capital gains
from the sale of private property. Other incomes commonly exempted from income tax include
scholarships, compensation for damages, and welfare payments. Most CITs allow personal and
dependent deductions in the individual income ta x .s
3.

T ax Rates

Most CITs have a progressive tax rate schedule, however, there is a wide variety of rate structures,
ranging from fifteen brackets for Romania and eight brackets in Bulgaria to a single rate in
Estonia and two brackets in Croatia and Latvia (Table 2).76 The choice o f rate structure overall
seems to strike a balance between the goals of revenue raising and redistribution with those
of encouraging work effort or savings and entrepreneurial activity. The normal top marginal
rate in CITs is 40 percent.77 Several countries have higher rates: Romania heads the list with a
top rate of 60 percent, followed by Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Moldova, all with a top rate of 50
percent, Hungary with 48 percent, and Poland with 45 percent.7* Russia’s top marginal rate is
35 percent and Kazakstan’s is 40 percent. Overall, these tax rate structures are not that different
from the tax rates currently in force in OECD countries (Table 2).79 The need to maintain a
close relation between the top individual rate and the company rate is not respected in many
CITs (Tables 1 and 2).
None of the CIT countries has explicit adjustments for inflation in the individual income
tax, however, about one-third define tax brackets in terms of minimum salaries or personal
allowances. Minimum salaries do not necessarily respond to inflation in an automatic form,
because they tend to be legislated periodically. Increases in minimum salaries are sometimes
not granted because o f their implications for macroeconomic and income policies, nevertheless,
their use is likely to be quite effective in slowing down the “bracket creep" that accompanies
individual income taxes in inflationary times.80
Revenue considerations have weighed heavily on the decision of whether or not to index
individual income taxes for inflation. When Poland introduced the new individual income tax
in 1992, it provided for the indexing of the three tax brackets for inflation. The government
decided against the implementation o f this measure in 1993, however, because of the need to
raise revenues to close the budget deficit (Kodrzycki, 1993). The Russian Federation first defined
the tax brackets in the individual income tax in terms o f the minimum wage but later switched
to nominal income amounts to define the brackets.
4.

T h e Integration o f Enterprise and Individual In co m e T a x e s

The existence of two separate taxes on individual and company income can lead to double
taxation of enterprise income and to the different tax treatment of distributed and retained
profits of enterprises. This is a complex issue that has received significantly different solutions
in Western countries.81 The approach to this issue also differs in the CITs. Some CITs have
adopted a “classical system” which subjects dividends to both company and individual income
tax at regular rates.82 A more common approach is partial integration by providing relief through
lower and flat rates for taxing dividends83 or partially exempting dividends from personal rates.84
Only four countries entirely exempt dividends at the personal level (Croatia, Albania, Latvia,
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and Lithuania), and one, Estonia, provides relief at the company level by granting a deduction
for the individual tax withheld.

F.

Payroll and Social Security Taxes

Payroll taxes or social security contributions are invariably high in CITs even when compared
to those prevalent in OECD countries (Tanzi, 1994). This is despite recent reforms that have
strived to reduce contribution rates. These changes are likely to continue as CITs proceed with
deeper reforms in their pension, disability, health insurance, and unemployment compensation
systems. Although it is generally not possible simply to add rates paid by employees and
employers, the outlier in terms o f high rates is Hungary, with a combined employee/employer
contribution of 58.5 percent. As o f 1996, eight CITs have combined employer/employee contri
butions between 40 and 50 percent.85 The lowest combined rates are just above 30 percent
(Table 2).8,1 Note, however, that to find full disincentive effects it would be necessary to add
income tax rates.
Although payroll taxes may be more or less linked with benefits to employees, there is
rightly a widespread concern among CITs that they may introduce an important antilabor bias
in the choice o f production technologies and damage international competitiveness. The high
burden on labor employment represented by payroll taxes in combination with the personal
income tax withheld on wages also creates significant incentives to shift jobs to the underground
economy McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1997). A more optimistic view o f this issue
is that the interaction between the benefits o f old-age pensions, health, and unemployment
insurance on the one hand, and the individual income tax on the other, could help secure
greater compliance with the latter (Hussian and Stern, 1993). The link between benefits and
better compliance with payroll taxes and ultimately income taxes, however, is often weak or
broken because eligibility and benefit levels are only loosely linked to individual contributions.
Often, as we see below, there are no employee contributions at all.
The general view of payroll and social security taxes differ among western countries.
Some o f these countries lump revenues from these levies with other types o f taxes and they
are taken as one o f several general sources o f funding for social welfare expenditures. Other
western countries view payroll and social security levies as specific contributions earmarked
to well-defined welfare programs. Most CITs appear to have adopted this latter model, but
with modifications. Without exception, CITs inherited comprehensive old-age pension and
health insurance systems from the previous regime. In most cases, the previous systems were
almost entirely financed by employers. At the present time, all FSU countries, including the
Baltics, still have systems that are 100 percent (or near that) employer-financed. This is also
currently the situation in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. The CITs spawned from the disintegra
tion o f Yugoslavia inherited a system with mixed employer-employee contributions. Hungary,
the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic also have mixed contributions systems.
In theory, the economic incidence of payroll taxes is not affected by the division of
charges between employers and employees, however, the use of explicit employee contributions
together with employer contributions offers several potential advantages: it is more transparent,
thus dispelling the misconception that benefits are free goods, and it may get employees more
interested in the overall management of the funds. A split payment system also offers the
possibility of tailoring contributions and benefits to individual circumstances.

G.

VAT and Other Indirect Taxes

The task for indirect taxation reform was clear from the start of the transition. There was a
need to replace the complex turnover taxes prevalent in the previous regime, which, as we
saw, at times had thousands o f rates. The basic choice for reform was between a single-stage
retail sales tax with wide coverage and only a few rates and a conventional invoice-credit VAT.
To a large extent, a retail sales tax can be more difficult to administer and enforce than a
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credit-invoice-type VAT. The VAT facilitates collection at the early stages of production or at
importation, allows effective exemption of capital goods and intermediate goods, and provides
easy adjustment o f indirect taxation for cross-border trade.® On the minus side, the VAT can
present problems in its extension to the retail level, and the crediting process for intermediate
payments of the tax can be easily abused. Many CITs opted for the adoption of VAT early in
the transition. In particular, those desiring to enter the EU adopted EU-style VATs, however,
several CITs used an intermediate strategy of simplifying and refining their existing turnover
taxes for a number o f years in preparation for the introduction of a VAT. Hungary, Russia, and
the rest of the CIS countries89 went cold turkey from turnover taxes to VAT. All other CITs had
a shorter or longer adaptation period. In some cases (e.g., Bulgaria and Croatia) VAT laws
were approved by the parliament but their implementation was postponed several times.
The current system of indirect taxation in CITs is similar to that in western and most
developing countries, and it consists o f a VAT or a general sales tax, a system of excises, and
taxes on international trade.

H.

Value-Added Tax (VAT)

By now all CITs except four have introduced a VAT. The four countries yet without a VAT are
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Albania. The three former Yugoslavian republics rely on general
sales taxes at the retail level as the main form o f indirect taxation. These sales taxes are still
characterized by multiple rates and some degree of cascading, but they represent significant
improvements on the old turnover taxes. The introduction of a VAT has been discussed in all
four of these countries, and Croatia, at least, plans to introduce a VAT in January 1997.
For those CITs that already have a VAT, two basic models were originally followed in
its adoption, although over the years almost every one of these countries has continued to
reform its VAT and some convergence has taken place.90 The first is the Russian model, which
was adopted in all CIS countries. This was a peculiar VAT system with many problems, as we
discuss below. The second is the European or the EU model, which was adopted with variations
by the rest of the Central and Eastern Europe CITs. Because of the significant differences
between the VATs in the two groups o f countries, they are discussed separately below.
I.

T h e V A T in Russia and O ther F S U Countries

Russia introduced a VAT in January 1992 patterned after the VAT approved by the Supreme
Soviet of the Soviet Union on December 6, 1991, just before the dissolution o f the USSR. With
the exception of the three Baltic countries, all other former Soviet republics also adopted a
VAT patterned after the Soviet Union VAT. Because of the economic and political weight of
Russia among CIS countries, they often followed Russian reforms, at least until recently.91
The VAT systems originally adopted in Russia and the rest of the CIS are extensively
reviewed in Summers and Sunley (1995) and Shome and Escolano (1993). Two positive aspects
o f the “Russian model” VAT were that it had a single rate, albeit high at 28 percent, and it had
a fairly broad base covering most goods and services.92 However, the Russian model also
presented many peculiarities and problems, some of which have been addressed over the past
few years, but others o f which still remain. One problem that Russia tried to address in 1996
is the accounting o f tax liabilities for sales on a cash basis. The cash method is fundamentally
incompatible with the effective application of the invoice-credit system, the cornerstone of
most modem VAT systems. The revenue consequences o f cash accounting for liabilities were
aggravated (and perhaps encouraged) by the high level of interenterprise arrears existing in
Russia and the rest of the CIS. The revenue performance of the VAT in these countries also
suffered, because despite the use o f a cash basis for liabilities, credit for the VAT paid for inputs
was allowed at the time inputs were put into production.
A second problem with the Russian model VAT is that the credit-invoice method was
only used in most o f the CIS for calculating tax liabilities at the manufacturing level. Liabilities
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at the wholesale and retail levels, in most service sectors, and in some countries at the manufactur
ing level as well, were calculated using a subtraction method VAT on the basis of taxpayers’
gross margins.93 This practice is still in effect in some CIS countries. It is also one reason that
VAT laws in many CIS countries, as we will see below, still do not have a minimum threshold
level of business for registration as a VAT taxpayer. A third problem with the original Russian
model VAT was that it denied credits for the VAT paid on capital inputs, which amounted to
28 percent tax on investment.*4 This practice destroyed the consumption basis of the VAT and
it introduced cascading elements in the tax, thus penalizing exports, among other things, even
if they were zero-rated. There were also problems of identifying creditable and noncreditable
taxes on business. Most o f the countries in the CIS now allow either a delayed credit over a
period o f several months or an instantaneous credit for capital purchases, and have clarified
crediting rules.
Another important peculiarity o f the Russian model VAT is that it applies the origin
method for trade among CIS countries. Exports within the CIS are treated as domestic sales,
so they are subject to tax, while imports are exempt from tax. In contrast, most countries with
a VAT use the destination method for international transactions with third countries.95 Under
the destination method, exports are zero-rated (exempt and given a credit for the tax on
purchases), and imports are subject to tax. The application of the origin method can cause
significant distortions and redistribution of revenues, especially when trade among the countries
is not balanced and the rates and base o f the VAT differ. For example, at the present time
Katakstan pays a VAT on imported capital goods to Russia and Ukraine, but as Summers and
Sunley (1995) point out, ultimately the question of which method (origin or destination) to
apply for the taxation of mutual trade depends on how these countries organize economic
cooperation among themselves. This difficult issue has not been resolved for trade within the
EU, either. The adoption of the destination method within the CIS would require the introduction
o f more effective border controls.
Also peculiar to the original Russian model VAT was the fact that imports were not
covered by tax. This has been reformed. At present, imports from outside the CIS are always
subject to VAT, but the base still differs.96 The prevalent structure of the VAT in CIS countries
is reviewed below using the most current information available, but this and all other aspects
of the tax structure, o f course, are continuously subject to change and revision.
a. Exempted Commodities. From the time of the original adoption of the VAT there
has been a significant increase in the number of exemptions and special treatments across most
o f the CIS countries. This has led to a significant narrowing of the tax base.97 The activities or
commodities deemed desirable for exemption vary' by country, but they typically include basic
foods, medicines and health services, education services, and public transport. Also exempted
are those difficult-to-tax sectors, including banking and insurance, farming, and housing. Many
CIS countries also exempt some professional services such as legal and translation services,
presumably because o f the difficulty of enforcing the tax in some areas.98
b. Scope o f the Tax. A hard decision for all CITs upon the introduction of a VAT was
whether or not to extend the tax to the retail level. As we saw, the CIS countries did extend
it, but with liabilities calculated on gross margins. A related decision involved the proper
treatment o f small businesses: how to avoid overburdening the system with small taxpayers
that could not be expected to carry the books o f accounts necessary to enforce the tax. The
original Russian model VAT had no registration limit threshold, and many of the CITs in this
group, including Russia, still do not have a specified threshold. Kazakhstan, Georgia, and
Turkmenistan have introduced thresholds that are defined in terms of minimum salaries or their
equivalents.
c. Tax Rates. All CITs in this group have a single rate for the VAT, except for Russia,
which applies a lower rate o f 10 percent to medicines and basic foods (Table 3). This is an
especially important positive design feature, given the current weakness of the tax administra
tions in these countries. Also important, given the application of an origin principle for trade
within the CIS, is that all these countries but two have the same VAT rate o f 20 percent. The

Table 3

Value Added Tax

Country

Rate
(reduced
rate; %)

Armenia

20%

Not applicable

Azerbijan

20%

Not applicable

Belarus

20%

Not applicable

Bulgaria

18%

Not applicable

Czech Republic

22%
(5%)

Basic foodstuffs, oil products,
pharmaceuticals, all services
except those specifically
taxed at 22%

Estonia

18%

Not applicable

Goods and services taxed
at reduced rate

Exemptions
Residential rents, insurance and bank
ing services, passenger transport,
municipal services, most social ser
vices, legal services, copyrights
and licenses
Residential rents, insurance and bank
ing services, legal services, copy
rights and licenses, certain food
stuffs, educational services
Public transport, postal, health, edu
cational, financial, and legal ser
vices, security operations, munici
pal services
Financial, insurance, educational,
health, and gambling services,
land sales, leasing of land and
buildings
Postal, financial, educational, health,
insurance, social and gambling ser
vices, radio and tv services, trans
fer of land and buildings (after
minimum 2 year holding require
ment)
Banking and .insurance, residential
lets, newspapers and periodicals,
medical equipment and services,
state postal, educational, and fu
neral services, gambling and lot
tery tickets

Definition of importation
of goods

Taxable base of
imported goods

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Customs value

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Customs value

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT
Goods passing customs
frontier into rest of
country

Customs value plus cus
toms duties, excise du
ties, and import fees

Goods cleared for free
circulation in country

Customs value plus cus
toms duties and fees
and excise duties

Importation of goods
from abroad

Customs value plus cus
toms duty

(Continued)

Table 3

Continued

Country

Rate
(reduced
rate; %)

Georgia

10%

Not applicable

Hungary

25%
(12%)

Household energy, medial instruments, basic foodstuffs,
agricultural, transportation

Kazakstan

20%

Not applicable

Kyrgyzstan

20

Not applicable

Latvia

18

Not applicable

Lithuania

18%
(9% until
1/1/97)

Moldova

20

Goods and services taxed
at reduced rate

Certain food products

Not applicable

Exemptions

Definition of importation
of goods

Residential lets, public transport, cer
tain basic foodstuffs, financial,
medical and educational services
Financial (excluding leasing), health,
educational, postal, radio, televi
sion, and gambling services

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT
Importation of a prod
uct in any manner

Financial, postal, scientific, and edu
cational services, lease of land
and buildings under certain condi
tions
Financial and banking services,
postal, educational, and cultural
services, public transport and utilit
ies, some copyrights and patents
Financial service, medicine and
health services, entertainment, resi
dential accommodations
Basic foodstuffs, insurance and bank
ing services, medicines and medi
cal equipment, newspapers,
books, and postal services
No information

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Taxable base of
imported goods
Customs value

Customs value plus cus
toms duties and fees
plus additional costs
incurred before prod
uct reaches first do
mestic destination
Customs value or value
equal to import lev
ies, duties and taxes
multiplied by 1.2

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT
Importation of goods
from abroad

No provision

Importation of goods
from abroad

Customs value plus cus
toms duty

No information

No information

Poland

22
(12, 7)

Romania

18 (9)

Agricultural machinery, medical
instruments, unexempted food
stuffs, hotel services, building
materials, passenger transport,
medical services; 12% rate ap
plies to fuels and energy
Basic foodstuffs and medicine

20 (10)

Basic foodstuffs and pharmaceu
ticals

Slovak Re
public

23 (6)

Basic foodstuffs, oil products,
pharmaceuticals, paper prod
ucts, all services except those
taxed at 23%

Tajikistan

Not applicable
20 (3%
special tax)

Turkmenistan

20

Not applicable

Ukraine

20

Not applicable

Uzbekistan

17

Not applicable

Customs value plus
customs duties, excise
duties, and import tax
of 3%

Financial services, leasing of land
and buildings, health, educational,
cultural, and sporting services
Residential lets, banking and insur
ance, capital contributions, gam
bling, sale of assets during privati
zation, financial, educational,
postal, cultural, and sports services
Financial, educational postal, cultural,
iasurance, social, gambling, radio,
and television services, transfer
and lease of land and new build
ing (2 years after acquisition)
Sale of assets during privatization, fi
nancial, educational, postal, cul
tural, translation, postal, and legal
services
Foodstuffs and children’s goods,
banking and postal services,
health care, pharmaceuticals, fur,
hides, raw cotton, and construc
tion materials
Transportation, financial, insurance,
postal, interpretation, cultural, and
educational services, public utilities,
pharmaceuticals, medical services
Exports, financial, cultural, and educa
tional services, public transport, pub
lic utilities, construction materials

Entry of goods from
abroad

Customs value plus
customs duties and
excises
Customs value plus
import duties and
excises

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Goods cleared for free
circulation in country

Customs value plus cus
toms duties, excise
taxes, and import sur
charge of 10%

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Customs value plus im
port duties and ex
cises

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Customs value plus cus
toms duties

Importation of goods
from outside CIS is
subject to VAT

Customs value plus cus
toms duties, excises

Note: Most CIS countries use a subtraction method for traders, use a restricted origin principle, and restrict for disallow credit for capital goods.
Source-. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
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Entry of goods from
abroad to customs ir
respective of manner
of entry
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Russia

Agricultural, financial, educational,
cultural, postal, and public admin
istration services, milk and dairy
products, poultry and fish
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exceptions at the present time are Georgia, with a rate of 10 percent, and Uzbekistan, with a
rate of 17 percent.
2.

T h e V A T in O th er C IT s

Hungary was again the front-runner in the reform of indirect taxation by replacing its turnover
tax with a VAT in 1988. The desire to join the EU weighs heavily in this decision. Next in line
were Poland and Romania, which introduced a VAT in the summer of 1993.
a. Exempted Commodities. Because many of these countries have a lower VAT tax
rate for certain commodities, such as food and medicines, the list of full exemptions is generally
smaller. Typically, health and educational services are exempt, as are hard-to-tax activities such
as banking and insurance. The trend has been toward expanding the tax base by reducing
exemptions, especially for services. Exports in this group o f CITs are zero-rated, so that they
are not only exempt, but there is a credit for VAT paid in the intermediate steps o f production.
In the early stages o f the reforms, several countries made more liberal use o f zero-rating. For
example, in the reform o f 1988 Hungary applied a zero rate to food and many other basic
goods, representing up to 40 percent of the tax base. Later reforms eliminated the zero rate
status for all goods with the exception of exports and medicines.
b. Scope o f the Tax. All CITs in this group have extended the coverage of the VAT
to the retail level using the invoice method, however, small businesses are exempted from
registering for the VAT. Unlike CITs in the CIS group, all CITs in this group have a well-defined
limit (an absolute money amount) for the threshold or minimum level o f business activity under
which businesses are not required to register under the VAT.
c. Tax Rates. Most of the countries in this group have adopted two rates for the VAT
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Lithuania) or a single rate (Bulgaria,
Estonia, and Latvia). The exception is Poland, which has three rates. The lower rates are used
for commodities such as food, medicines, or transportation, which in other countries may be
exem pt." Several countries in this group have experienced rate changes. For example, Romania
started with a single rate and later switched to two rates, and Estonia and Latvia started with
relatively low rates and later increased them.
The top tax rates for the VAT in this group o f CITs tend to be higher than those in Western
VATs. This has been explained as due to the fact that tax bases in CITs tend to be narrower
both statutorily and economically and perhaps also by CITs’ high revenue requirements. Hungary
levies the highest rate at 25 percent, followed by the Slovak Republic at 23 percent, and Poland
and the Czech Republic, both at 22 percent. All other CITs in this group have a top rate of 18
percent (Table 2).
3.

O ther Indirect T a x e s

Other forms of indirect taxes in CITs, such as excise taxes and taxes on international trade,
have received much less attention in the literature, perhaps signifying their smaller importance
in overall revenues.100
a.
Excise Taxes. Hungary was the first CIT to adopt western-type separate excise tax
These were adopted with the new VAT in 1988. Most CITs also introduced separate excise
taxes when they introduced their VATs or earlier in the transition when the old turnover taxes
were simplified in preparation for the adoption o f a VAT. With few exceptions, CITs levy
excises on the traditional commodities: tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and petroleum
products. In some CITs the list of excisable commodities is augmented by several “luxury
goods.” This category, not surprisingly, varies across countries. There is also a variety of rates.
Specific rates are used in some CITs for petroleum, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products,
but ad valorem rates are much more common.
In the CIS countries that adopted the Russian model VAT, excise goods imported from
other CIS are exempt from domestic taxes. This is in harmony with the origin method used for
the VAT for transactions within the CIS, however, imports of excise goods from non-CIS countries
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are subject to excise taxes. Because excise rates can differ significantly within the CIS, it appears
there has been a considerable increase in trade within the CIS to arbitrage these differences.
Contraband coming through some of these countries also appears to be on the rise.
b.
Customs Duties. As we have seen, taxes falling on imports were not an important
part o f the revenue systems of planned socialist economies. For example, imports in the Soviet
Union were not subject to the 5 percent multistage sales tax (known as the Gorbachev tax)
covering many goods and services, but rather were taxed separately. The separate import levy
fell exclusively on consumption goods and primarily attempted to tax the windfall profits from
conversion to rubles at the official exchange rate. Some CITs did not tax imports in any way
in the earlier years of the transition. At the present time, all CITs have adopted a customs duties.
While some Central and Eastern Europe CITs have acted wisely by introducing modestly
protective tariffs with low rate dispersion, the norm among CITs that are part of the CIS has
been to put into place high tariff rates with wide dispersion, thus succumbing to pressures for
the protection o f domestic activities and for using import levies as a significant source o f tax
revenue. In particular, the taxation of consumer goods and the exemption of imported inputs
are likely to lead to high and variable rates o f effective protection across econom ic sectors.
Collapsing employment and economic activity in many sectors, the lack of quality o f domestic
products, and the availability o f cheaper better-quality imports have added to protectionist
pressures in many CITs. Some of these countries, it appears, are embarking upon the protectionist
and import-substitution policies that until recent years had entrapped Latin American countries.101
These policies will lead to the misallocation o f domestic resources, lend an antiexport bias to
production activities, and retard economic growth.

I.

The Modernization and Reform of Tax Administration

Whether or not the tax reform effort ultimately succeeds in economies in transition depends
upon the strength or lack thereof of the tax administration system. Governments have adopted
westem-style tax structures with relative ease, yet have struggled with low rates of revenue
mobilization and increasing rates of tax evasion. The modernization and structural reform of
tax administrations in CITs has lagged behind other reforms, including price liberalization and
privatization. The relative lack o f attention paid to tax administration issues early in the transition
is a legacy from the unimportant role played by the tax administration in CPEs,'02 but without
comprehensive modernization and reform o f their tax administrations, the tax reform effort in
CITs will continue to face an uncertain future.
1.

D ecreased R ev enue M obilization and the E conom y

Tax revenues in Central and Eastern Europe CITs plunged in the years immediately following
the early reforms.103 The Baltic countries, Russia, and the rest o f the CIS also experienced a
significant deterioration o f tax revenues in real terms and for most of them also as a percentage
o f GDP since 1991 (Citrin and Lahiri, 1995; Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri, 1995). This decline
in revenues is due in large part to economic factors, not the least of which is the collapse of
economic activity in the traditional sectors o f the economy.104
Specific economic features of transition economies may have also contributed to the poor
revenue performance. High rates of inflation could have contributed to revenue erosion. Most
CITs have been subject to spurts of high rates of inflation, especially in the earlier years of the
transition. Other economies around the world experiencing high inflation have seen an erosion
of real tax revenues because of the lag between the time when income is generated or the
economic transaction takes place and the time when taxes are actually paid (a phenomenon
known as the Tanzi effect). In many CITs, however, collection lags have been relatively short
by international standards.105 The general lack of indexation o f tax structure probably had a
mixed impact on revenue performance. The depreciation o f capital at historical costs and in
some cases bracket creep in the individual income tax helped increase tax revenues. Other
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features o f the tax structure, such as the use o f historical costs for the calculation o f the VAT
at the retail level in CIS countries or the exemption of interest income and full deduction of
interest costs led to losses in revenues. The different composition of tax bases in CITs may
also have had an impact on revenue performance. For example, the exemption from VAT of
basic commodities such as food, medicines, transportation, or housing consumption in CITs
likely represents larger foregone revenues than is the case in western economies because of
the differences in household budget composition in the two groups of countries.

2.

Im pact of P olicy o n T a x Administration

A commonly aired criticism o f tax policy in CITs has been its rapid change and instability
(McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace, 1997; Khankevich, 1996; Bahl and Wallich, 1995;
Bogetic and Hillman, 1994). The scope and frequency o f changes to the tax system cannot be
accurately measured by changes to the tax code. Frequendy presidential decrees, administrative
orders, and instructions are used to modify the tax code. The continuous process o f change
reduces the transparency o f the tax system, inhibits the ability of tax administrators to correctly
ascertain individual tax liabilities, and tends to overwhelm honest taxpayers.107 Rapid policy
changes lead to either perceived or real opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance, and
therefore to an increased perception of unfairness in the tax system. Taxpayers, faced with a
rapidly evolving tax code, often unilaterally decide liability issues in their favor. Tax administra
tors must decide between what is an incorrectly calculated tax liability due to the vagueness
in the tax code and what is a genuine attempt to evade some part o f an individual taxpayer’s
liability.108 Instability o f the tax structure can also discourage investment, especially by foreign
companies (Riordan and McLure, 1993).
A troubling factor from the policy side is that substantial tax changes have been systemati
cally introduced with little or no preparation and education of tax administrators and taxpayers.
Commonly, tax policy reform in CITs has been divorced from the necessary complementary
legislation reform on the tax administration side."” The most important example is provided
by the VAT, which was introduced in most CITs with no adequate preparation110 and led to
unexpected decreases in revenues.111
Tax administration has been made more complex and the revenue streams to the state
treasuries reduced by CIT government and ministries’ continued issuance o f ad hoc exemptions
and tax holidays.112 As we discussed in our review of enterprise profit taxes, the consequences
o f these policies go beyond administration and collections. The issuance of exemptions, tax
holidays, and ad hoc adjustments are based upon the perception that certain sectors, such as
agriculture or energy, are more “important" or that government bureaucrats can improve on
the resource allocation by markets, but a more likely outcome is that these policies result in a
misallocation o f resources in the economy, leading to lower potential GDP, increased horizontal
inequities, tax evasion, and reduced incentives for market reform.
A different type o f policy in CITs impinging on the effectiveness o f tax administration is
the emerging use o f “tax offsets.” Using tax offsets, government agencies pay for their purchases
with tax exemptions, which enterprises may then submit in lieu of cash in the settlement of
the tax bill. In Russia during early 1996 a sharp increase in the fiscal deficit occurred as over
50 percent o f enterprises used tax offsets to settle the tax accounts in June and July (Ministry
of Finance of the Russian Federation, 1996). A variant of this system has been used in Kazakhstan,
in which the government established a clearinghouse of tax and payment arrears. Enterprises
that were owed money by the government could “swap” these liabilities for tax liabilities,
effectively settling the existing arrears.
Other aspects of institutional reform have an impact on the effectiveness o f tax administra
tion. An important handicap for effective tax administration in CITs has been the incompatibility
of old accounting systems with the western-type taxes these countries have adopted. A conspicu
ous example o f this incompatibility has been the use o f cash accounting and the invoice method
for the VAT in Russia and other CIS countries."1Over the years, many CITs have started adopting
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new accounting systems (e.g., Kazakhstan in 1995 and Russia in 1996), but their implementation
will be a long-term effort.

J.

Tax Evasion and the Integrity of Tax Administration

No formal studies, to our knowledge, exist on the extent and level o f evasion in CITs, however,
an increasing number o f informal estimates seem to confinn that there is a considerable degree
of tax evasion in these countries. A recent Russian Federation Ministry o f Finance report
estimated that the compliance rates for the VAT and enterprise profit tax fluctuated between
50 and 60 percent in 1995 and 1996. In Latvia it has been estimated that the informal economy
outside the tax net represents between 30 and 50 percent o f all economic activity.'” The
existence of widespread tax evasion is also confirmed in a number of taxpayer surveys,11'
however, it is not uncommon for tax officials to be unaware o f or deny the existence of tax
evasion in their countries (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995; Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
Often these estimates of evasion make no distinction between underreporting and nonfil
ing. Extrapolating from the experience with tax evasion in industrial and developing countries,
nonfiling should be the more important phenomenon among smaller private businesses. Tax
administrations in CITs have had to cope with a rapid increase in the number o f private
entities. Khankevich (1996) reports that during 1995 total tax payments of unincorporated
private entrepreneurs in Belarus increased by 575 percent after the intervention o f tax inspectors.
Underreporting, through underinvoicing, transfer pricing, and the like, should be a more impor
tant source of evasion among traditional state enterprises and larger new businesses. Khankevich
(1996) also reports that during 1995 commercial enterprises in Belarus concealed approximately
one-half o f their taxable income and that 93 percent of total tax payments occurred only after
the intervention of tax inspectors. A practice o f manipulating enterprise accounts in Russia
reported by the OECD (1995a) may be symptomatic of the scale and sophistication o f underre
porting in CITs.116 The opportunity for evasion will be increased with the introduction o f tax
holidays and other special tax treatments.
High taxpayer compliance costs can also be a significant factor in tax evasion. Compliance
costs are higher if taxpayers have to wait in line for a long time to pay their taxes, forms are
not available or lack instructions, or if the laws are complex and vague, requiring taxpayers to
hire expert advice to complete their tax returns. These conditions are descriptive o f the present
conditions in many CITs. Additional filing requirements are also part of compliance costs. For
example, in Russia and other CIS countries, taxpayers are required to file balance sheets and
income statements on a quarterly basis, despite the fact that much of this information is hardly
used by the tax administration.
Corruption and bribery of tax officials, made easier by low wages, is often mentioned
on an informal basis as a growing cause o f increasing evasion in CITs. A milder version of
questionable practices is moonlighting by tax officials who give tax advice to private taxpayers.
As the tax code has become more complex in CITs, the need for professional skills and
specialization in tax laws has increased, and in some countries tax officials have been all too
happy to fill the vacuum of expertise,” however, some countries have introduced strong
conflict-of-interest laws to deal with this problem.118
Several other practices of tax administrations in CITs are likely to affect tax evasion. One
of them is to permanently assign tax inspectors to particular enterprises, thus opening the
possibility of corruption and other problems. The random assignment of audit cases to tax
inspectors, as is done in most western countries, is an effective way to reduce opportunities
for corruption. A second practice has been to earmark a share of tax penalties and additional
assessments from audits to the tax administration. The “rewards” are typically divided among
the local and central offices and in some cases a small portion goes as financial incentive to
the tax inspector. While most tax administrations are in need of additional funds, it is clear that
this practice is vulnerable to abuse.
Despite these problems and other organizational and procedural shortcomings o f transi-
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tion tax administrations (discussed below), it would be all too easy to blame the increases in
tax evasion in CITs exclusively on weak tax administrations. There are other aspects o f the tax
systems, such as high and cumulative marginal tax rates, ambiguous or poorly drafted tax laws,
and repeated changes in the laws that are also likely to bear on this issue. Also unrelated to
the tax administration per se, and much harder to overcome, is the legacy o f distrust o f the
state and the lack of a tradition of voluntary compliance in CITs (Kornai, 1990; Tanzi, 1994;
Bogetic and Hillman, 1994; Summers and Sunley 1995; McLure, 1995b).

K.

Tax Administration Organization and Procedures

Technical assistance, principally from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also from the
World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the EU, have
all contributed significantly to the process of modernizing tax administration in many CITs. The
organization and the operating procedures o f many transitional tax administrations, however,
still remain woefully inadequate to the task at hand. We review some o f the remaining problems
below.
1.

O rganization Issues

The tax administrations in Russia and the rest o f the CIS countries for the most part still have
the same territorial and organizational structure they inherited from the Soviet Union. Most
collection and enforcement activities are carried out at the lowest level (territorial inspectorates
in Russia). The regional offices supervise and coordinate the efforts of the local offices and
report collections and other information to the central office. In CIS countries, the power and
control exerted by the central office over the regional offices varies, but are considerably weaker
than those found in western tax administration systems.119
The organizational structure of the territorial tax offices is by type o f taxpayer (e.g.,
individuals and enterprises) or by type of tax (e.g., VAT), which leads to the duplication of
tasks and to a lack o f specialization in the more demanding areas of tax enforcement, such as
field audits. Western tax administrations have functionally based organizations with specialized
offices for the major tasks o f registration, collection, audit, computerization, and so on. Although
some eastern European countries have adopted functionally based organizations, the process
has been slower in CIS countries.120
2.

Registration Issues

The challenge in this area is for transition tax administrations to be able to monitor nonfilers
and stop-filers. A unique and well-designed taxpayer identification number (TIN) is one key
for carrying out these tasks properly. Most CITs have such a system or are developing one,
however, there are problems with the design o f the system and in many cases the TINs are
not unique (Kamite and Dovladbekova, 1995). Although there is concern in many CITs about
the increasing ranks o f nonfilers in the private sector, few coordinated efforts are being put
into place to address this problem.
3.

C ollection Issues

Tax arrears represent a constant or increasing problem in many CITs. There are multiple
causes for these arrears, including the existence o f governmental arrears with enterprises. 'I he
monitoring o f collections is in many cases still carried out manually on ledger cards, and many
CITs lack coordinated plans and procedures to detect and collect arrears. On the other hand,
several CITs’ tax administrations appear to make effective use o f legislation that allows them
to garnish or seize bank deposits from delinquent taxpayers.
The practice inherited from the past of setting quotas or revenue targets by local office
may have contributed to a lackluster performance. Once revenue targets are satisfied, there is
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less motivation to vigorously pursue collections of arrears. Revenue forecasting using modem
techniques is rarely performed. Poor forecasts have also led on some occasions to unrealistic
collection quotas. Failure to meet these quotas has been at times indiscriminately interpreted
as flagging tax enforcement. Local tax offices have developed an array o f techniques, such as
pleading with taxpayers to prepay their taxes, to satisfy the official quotas.

4.

Audit Issues

This key area of tax enforcement has been slow to develop. Most CITs have no tradition in
modem audit techniques. In the past, enterprises were restricted to a single bank account and
state banks were used to monitor tax compliance. Currently audit work consists of office audits
using the returns and financial statements submitted by taxpayers. Office or “cameral" audits
often are perfunctory. Field audits and the use of third-party information remains rare. Audit
plans and audit selection programs are also rare.
In Russia and other CIS countries the norm inherited from the Soviet Union was to audit
100 percent of all taxpayers at least every two years. Managers still remain focused on reconciling
100 percent of tax declarations instead of concentrating on those accounts with the greatest
revenue potential, but it has become clear that full audits are no longer possible with any
reasonable level of resources. Neither are they necessary. A self-assessment system for the most
important taxes combined with well-targeted and publicized audit programs of sample taxpayers
and presumptive taxation methods for nonfilers, can be much more effective enforcement tools.
In Russia and other CIS countries penalties are harsh and rules for their application inflexible.
A penalty of up to 50 percent of the omission is routinely applied to taxpayers who have
made honest mistakes. In addition, interest rate charges compounded daily make it necessarily
impossible for many taxpayers to pay their liabilities, driving them down into the underground
economy.

5.

Taxpayer S erv ices

This area of tax administration, part o f the "methodology” section in CIS countries, is extremely
weak. Taxpayer services were unknown under the previous system and are emerging slowly.
Taxpayer familiarity with taxes remains low; often taxpayers do not have access to tax regulations
or even tax forms, and very rarely are these forms accompanied by adequate filing instructions.
Often, taxpayers have to pay to get instruction booklets and tax forms. On top o f everything,
taxpayer services also have to combat the confusion introduced by rapid changes in the tax
code and the deep-rooted general distrust o f government institutions.

6.

R eso u rce Availability

Practically speaking, all transitional tax administrations must attempt to collect taxes with
inadequate resources. A prime problem is that tax administrators are unable to retain skilled
personnel due to the higher wages in the private sector. The high rate of turnover at times has
worked in fact as a deterrent to aggressive training programs in computerization and accounting.
Although there is little disagreement about the importance of training, most CITs still
need to develop a structured long-term training program for tax officials in modem tax adminis
tration and accounting practices.
Until now the lack o f financial resources has prevented the creation of information systems
that facilitate many tasks, such as registration, collections, monitoring, auditing, and billing of
taxpayers. Some computerization of tax administration services is taking place, but often this
is not adequately preceded by clearly designed procedures and systems. Often there is a lack
of coordination of these efforts in different parts of the country, which is likely to lead to
significant problems of data compatibility and administration in the future.
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Future Dilemmas in Tax Administration

The transition to market economies and the reform of other areas of the public sector have
presented tax administrations in CITs with several additional dilemmas; including the following.
1.

Is T h e re a N eed for Regional and Local G ov ern m ent T a x Adm inistrations?

Tax administration used to be a local and regional function in most CPEs. Early in the transition,
most CITs nationalized and centralized their tax services. Former local and regional tax officials
become employees o f the national tax service. The elevation o f the tax administration to national
status did not generally result in a single subordination structure, however. In practice, if not
de jure, the system o f dual subordination, in which tax administrators answered to central
or federal authorities and to local authorities, remained. In some CIS countries, subnational
government authorities still have the right to approve key appointments in the territorial offices
of the state tax administration. The distribution o f resources in many cases has not adapted to
a more centralized tax administration system.121
The importance of dual subordination is highlighted by the reliance of local tax inspecto
rates on local governments for the provision of housing, medical, and other social services.
This reliance has given leverage to local governments to pressure tax administrators to ensure
that local governments are the first to receive revenues, to collect and audit those taxes in
which local government sharing is most important even if they have a lower revenue potential,
and to go easy at times on enterprises deemed important by the local authorities.'22 When local
taxes exist, local authorities can exert pressure to see that these taxes are given priority. A
different view, and often a complaint of local and regional officials, is that the national tax
service has much less o f an incentive to allocate scarce resources to the collection o f local
taxes.123 Most CITs rightly have opted for the time being to concentrate on the development
o f the national tax administration, but there seems to be some consensus across CITs that in
the longer run it will be desirable to develop local or regional independent tax administrations
that would be exclusively in charge o f administering subnational taxes.
2.

T ax Adm inistration and T ax P olice

It has been quite common in CITs to introduce an organization parallel to the tax administration
that is charged with the investigation o f tax fraud and other illegal activities such as illicit hard
currency dealings. In some CITs this organization has been staffed by the former secret police
as part o f an entirely separate organization or attached to the tax administration but with
separate status and rules and regulations (Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994; Martinez-Vazquez, 1995).
Although specialized officials concentrating on criminal investigation issues related to tax compli
ance are badly needed, this problem appears to have been approached in many CITs in a
heavy-handed way. The concern is that this approach may actually backfire, given the lack of
trust in government institutions. In addition, the duplication of functions o f the tax administration
and the tax police may be inconsistent, is a waste of resources, and may penalize taxpayers
unduly.
3.

Shou ld the T ax Administration B e in C h arge o f So cial Secu rity C ontributions?

Many CITs are also struggling with decreasing compliance rates for social security contributions
or payroll taxes, whose revenues are earmarked to extrabudgetary funds. In many o f the CITs
the typical arrangement is that collection and audit o f payroll taxes are carried out by inspectors
o f the extrabudgetary funds. These inspectors are generally fewer in relative terms and less
well trained than those o f the regular tax administration. The self-enforcement element for
social security contributions expected from the link between contributions and benefits is in
many cases weak. Benefits may not be related to contributions or, when they are, the link
involves only the last years of employment.
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To confront the problem of declining compliance, CITs would need to invest heavily in
programs to modernize and strengthen the enforcement of social security contributions, but
given that public resources are very scarce and that similar resource investments are needed
for the general tax administration, the question is whether or not economies of scale can be
realized by integrating the collection and enforcement of social security contributions into
the regular tax administration. Those that answer yes argue that a smaller investment and a
strengthened collection and enforcement mechanism for both social security contributions and
taxes are possible. The economies of scale come from the fact that much of the work extrabudget
ary fund inspectors need to do in collections and audit duplicates the work o f the regular tax
administration for enforcing the withholding tax on wages and salaries.
International practice in western countries in the organization of the enforcement of social
security contributions is varied. In some countries, the tax administration may be responsible
for collecting and enforcing social security contributions. In other countries, there may be a
specialized agency separate from the tax administration for collecting and enforcing all types
o f social security contributions. Still a different model puts each social security agency, such
as the pension fund and the health fund, in charge of collecting and enforcing its respective
contributions.
If CITs do decide to integrate collections of social security contributions and all other
taxes, care is needed to address an incentive problem. Regular tax administration may not
always have the same incentives to collect contributions as to collect taxes. A solution may be
to “lease” the services of the tax administration to collect and enforce contributions, making
sure that the agreement is incentive-compatible on both sides of the bargain.

V.

CONCLUSION

The last five to six years o f fiscal reform in CITs have provided a formidable economic experiment
in tax policy design and practice. Given the diversity of countries involved, it is not easy, and
indeed in some cases it may be misleading, to arrive at general conclusions and lessons from
this experiment. The paths and strategies for fiscal reform followed by CITs differ considerably,
as, not surprisingly, do the outcomes. The experiences range from the case of Estonia, for
example, which adopted a clean modem tax structure in 1993, with wide bases and single
rates and has barely changed since then, to the case of Belarus, for example, which has not
changed the substance of the tax system it inherited from the Soviet Union and yet has undertaken
a myriad of continuous changes in the tax laws. Despite the caveat on the diversity o f experi
ences, several general conclusions emerge from CIT experiences with fiscal reform.
First, it is well known to practitioners that the reform o f tax systems never takes place
on a clean slate. The legacy of the philosophy and practices o f tax systems under centralized
planning has played a significant role in all CITs.
Tax systems in CPEs had markedly different functions from those in market economies.
Tax systems in CPEs focused on cash management and balancing demand with available supply.
These tax systems dealt with a relatively small number o f state enterprises with a focus on
heavy industry, and used customized, discriminatory, and at times retroactive measures to
promote priority areas in the central plan and penalize economic activity that was viewed as
socially unproductive. There was much less concentration on using tax systems for the more
conventional purposes such as income distribution or even revenue adequacy, since govern
ments had the ability to syphon out profits from state enterprises in a variety o f ways other
than taxes and were free to set wages.
Tax administration in CPEs was made easy by the pervasive presence o f the state in the
economy. Tax administrators could use the state banking system to track all sorts o f payments
so that tax enforcement was an issue in applying proper accounting procedures. At the same
time, tax administrators had extraordinary powers to negotiate tax liabilities and even to adjust
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tax rates retroactively. In sum, CPEs had few reasons to develop tax administrations with many
of the features that exist in western countries.
The ability to shake off the legacies of the past has varied among CITs. In those countries
with stronger ties to Western Europe (e.g., the Baltics, the Czech Republic, and Poland), the
philosophical shift has been accomplished more rapidly than in Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania,
and many of the CIS countries, but at any rate, the lesson is that there can be no good
understanding o f the current problems of tax systems in CITs without deep knowledge of the
institutional and behavioral legacies inherited from the previous regimes. For example, the
central authorities in all CITs have created de novo national tax administration systems. The
traditional attachment o f tax administrators to regional and local authorities, however, makes
many o f these national tax administrations very different institutions from the centralized tax
administrations in western countries. National interests or a national perspective in many CIT
tax administrations are still secondary to local ones.
Second, tax systems are as good as their enforcement. Effective tax reform cannot be
accomplished in isolation from the current capabilities of the tax administration systems and
taxpayers’ culture. In retrospect, the most serious mistake CITs collectively made was to focus
primarily on modernizing tax policies and relegating tax administration and taxpayer issues to
a remote second place. Scant attention and fewer resources were dedicated early on in the
transition to reforming and strengthening tax administration and preparing taxpayers for the
new taxes and procedures.
This happened despite the almost universal recommendation from the international advi
sors o f giving first priority to the restructuring and modernization o f the tax administration
systems in CITs. There were abundant warnings early on about the substantial investments in
the time and resources needed to modernize tax administrations. The advice for the most part
was not heeded. Because the time required for these efforts to take effect was measured in
years, the focus shifted to tax policy reform, albeit in many cases without considering the legacy
o f the previous system or the limited capacity o f the current administration. The results have
been in many cases lagging collections and increased tax evasion.
O f late, there has been wide explicit recognition in CITs o f the need to improve tax
administration systems, but still there is often no priority given in the allocation o f resources
devoted to this effort. Fundamental problems still remain. Tax administrations in many CITs
are still not functionally organized and they lack adequate programs for registration, collection,
and auditing. There is also a lack of human and physical capital resources to handle the
increased number o f taxpayers. Addressing the resource constraint will not solve all the tax
service problems, but it needs to be a starting point. In order to ensure that resources are
available to the modernization of the tax service some extraordinary measures may be required.
CIT governments could divert a fixed portion of increases in real revenues to the improvement
o f the tax administration service. The fixed percentage o f revenues could exclude fines and
penalties and would be enacted with the sunset provision that the legislature must review and
reapprove the fund after a specified period of time.
Third, tax policy reform need to carefully assess different options against explicit economic
objectives, to be comprehensive, and to be swiftly enacted and left unchanged for some time.
In practice, the experience o f most CITs did not meet these standards.
A good portion o f the tax reform process in CITs has been carried out without an explicit
evaluation o f how well the different proposals would perform against standard objectives,
including revenue performance, economic neutrality, tax burden distribution, and simplicity
and administrative feasibility. Shortchanging the preparation stage led inevitably to ad hoc
continuous patching o f the system, creating confusion among tax administrators and taxpayers
alike and creating uncertainty for domestic and national investors.124
The two main choices for tax policy reform in transitional economies were to immediately
replicate a model western tax system or to develop a tax system that, while modem, would
take the realities o f the transitional environment into account. In practice, there was a varying
mixture of the two approaches and rarely with the right balance. Countries that immediately
adopted western-designed taxes often encountered significant problems because of the incom
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patibility o f these taxes with accounting practices or the lack o f familiarity of tax administrators
and taxpayers with the new taxes.125 Some of these problems should have been expected, but
they were aggravated by the lack of preparations for the reform or the failure to implement
other supporting reforms, such as accounting or ownership titling. On the other hand, those
countries that tried to adapt the tax system to their unique transitional structures often ran into
the problem of continued change under different pressures, bringing more instability and
uncertainty into the transition process.
With hindsight, the report card on tax reform is one of missed opportunity. Ideally, CITs
should have adopted a tax structure that was simple and well adapted to the institutional and
administrative constraints o f the transition environment. Then they should have kept these
systems stable for several years and used that time to modernize and upgrade their tax administra
tion systems and educate their taxpayers. In many cases the reform of the tax structure replicating
“best practice” in western market economies came too soon.
The report card on tax reform efforts in CITs comes up short against many of the standard
objectives of tax reform. Although there are exceptions, most CIT tax systems have not accom
plished the objective o f simplicity. Often there are unnecessary taxes, and the standard taxes
are too complex. Simplicity will require that taxes have fewer rates and the broadest possible
base, eliminating many exemptions and deductions. Simplicity will also require getting rid of
nuisance taxes and other taxes with low revenue potential, making tax declarations simple and
clear, and demanding only from taxpayers information that is relevant to tax enforcement.
Tax systems in CIT also come up short against the objective o f economic neutrality. Here,
many CITs appear not to have learned the lessons from their own past or even those from
western countries. Many CITs have continued their interventionist legacies, and the trend would
appear to have worsened in recent times. Special treatment leads to distortions, abuses, increased
compliance and administrative costs, and taxpayer inequities and resentment. CIT tax systems,
for the most part, have not provided the desired level of stability in tax institutions. Continuous
changes in the tax structure have contributed to increased administrative and compliance costs,
have facilitated tax evasion, and have discouraged economic activity. The tax system must
retain some measure o f stability in order to create a positive climate for economic activity and
to allow tax administrators and taxpayers to adjust to the new system. CITs also need to lower
compliance costs for taxpayers. This goal will depend to a large extent on keeping the tax
laws simple, but also on eliminating unnecessary requirements, such as filing balance sheets
and income statements every quarter or physically queuing for a long time to pay taxes.
The new tax systems in CITs have not been particularly successful in generating adequate
revenues either, however, here it is all too easy to be inappropriately harsh given the extraordi
nary circumstances of prolonged and significant declines in real economic activity during the
transition.
It is too early to judge the impact of CIT tax systems on income redistribution. On the
whole, early fears on aggressive use o f the tax system to accomplish income redistribution
objectives have not materialized. Despite their cultural legacy, or perhaps in reaction to it, CIT
policies in this area have been moderate. Nevertheless, widespread tax evasion is likely to
make CIT tax systems inequitable in both a horizontal and a vertical sense.
Finally, the success o f tax reform has depended to a large extent on institutional and
structural reform throughout the economy. The evidence seems to indicate that CITs that moved
quickly to restructure their economies have fared better over the past five years than countries
that have been slow to implement reform (World Bank, 1996). Too often CITs that have been
less successful in the tax reform arena adopted a strategy of approving the new tax laws and
waiting for the new system to operate by itself. These countries have been slower in modernizing
their accounting systems, strengthening and enforcing bankruptcy laws, and reforming their
entire legal systems.

NOTES
1.

CITs refers to all previous ccntrally planned or socialist countries in Central and F.astem Europe
and in the former Soviet Union. This chapter does not address the cases of China, Vietnam,
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North Korea, Cuba, or Mongolia. A distinctive feature of this group of countries is that with
the exception of Mongolia the varying degrees of economic and fiscal reform are taking place
in the context of authoritarian regimes.
This chapter focuses on tax policy and tax administration and does not address intergovernmen
tal Finance issues. This is done to keep the chapter to a manageable length. This is an important
omission because in many cases the shape and impetus for tax policy in CITs has come from
intergovernmental tensions. In addition, important tax administration issues in CITs are closely
intertwined with the structure of intergovernmental relations.
We use this label to designate the same group of countries now in transition from their former
regimes.
Also see Kopits (1991b) and Owens (1991b) for additional cross-country comparisons. The
comparison of tax revenue structures in CPEs and western market economies can be misleading
because of the much larger role played by state enterprises in CPEs.
Bird and Casanegra (1992) have usefully termed this “boutique” tax administration (in contrast
to “mass" administration).
These taxes were not like a westem-style turnover (gross receipts) tax.
Revenues collected from wage and payroll taxes were used to fund social expenditures,
housing, education, culture, health care, and pensions (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992).
However, workers in the Soviet Union, for example, received payroll slips biweekly on which
both gross and net salaries were reported.
This argument is made by Bogetic and Hillman (1994). See also Blejer and Szapary (1991)and
Bakes (1991).
The wage fund was one of several institutionalized vehicles for the distribution of enterprises’
net profits.
Poland, for example, set the rate of return on the “founding fund” at 32 percent. The founding
fund was defined as the net book value of the enterprise in 1983, inclusive of any subsequent
capital transfers (Gray, 1991).
This point is emphasized in many studies of taxation in socialist planned economies. See, for
example, Gandhi and Milhaljek (1992).
Government revenue from “financial repression” has also been a common phenomenon in
developing countries. See Giovannini and M. de Melo (1990).
An often cited example: until recently Romania and Bulgaria imposed income taxes on childless
persons, purportedly in an attempt to promote higher birth rates.
The public sector importance of these activities was evidenced during the transition as firms
began to divest these responsibilities and increased pressure on government budgets. See
Bird, F.bel, and Wallich (1995).
Kornai (1986, 1992) called CPEs’ taxes “soft taxes.” See Owens (1991b).
There are no exact Figures on the composition of these different items. Kodrzycki (1993)
reports that in the late 1980s, nontax revenues accounted for 8 percent of GDP on average,
twice the corresponding level for western economies during the same period.
The Chinese have carried the negotiation approach one step further with the use of formal
contracts. The provincial government negotiates a tax contract with state-owned enterprises,
usually stating a quota amount of tax to be paid, but offering lower marginal tax rates to
enterprises that exceed the quota amount. Though the contracts were supposedly limited to
the enterprise income tax, they were also used widely for the value added tax. The practice
of tax contracting was eliminated by the 1994 reform (Bahl, 1997).
The absence of conventional tax distortion in CPEs did not mean, of course, that these countries
escaped economic inefficiencies. In fact, the inefficiencies associated with the pervasive inter
ference of the state in the allocation of resources throughout the economy were quite extensive.
In addition to the inefficiency of decisions, central planning eroded incentives to innovate,
work, and save. The common state of affairs was an economy with excess demand controlled
by physical rationing and shortages in production (Kopits, 1991b; Kornai, 1990).
Controlled prices meant that enterprises could not alter prices or wages to shift the burden
of payroll, profit, or turnover taxes onto consumers or workers. I-abor supply could hardly
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be affected by taxation due to restrictions on labor mobility and monetary and most in-kind
compensation, however, higher enterprise taxes could have been shifted to labor if they
reduced the size of the wage fund. Also, the high rate income taxes imposed on some
professionals were probably successful in discouraging "undesirable behavior."
Nevertheless, personal savings accounts were common in many CPEs, and a substantial portion
were voluntary savings. An important reason was the incompleteness of the social safety net,
including low pensions, and the lack of efficient insurance mechanisms. Savings accounts also
existed in part due to shortages in consumer products. These unspent balances led to the
monetary overhang in Russia and other countries in transition prior to the liberalization of
prices. This overhang was later eliminated by inflation and also, in Russia, by reneging on
large denomination ruble bills.
Estimates from a number of studies suggest that from 15 to 30 percent of the labor force in
CPEs was hoarded labor (Gora, 1991). The impact of excess-wage taxes is discussed in Section
V. The overemployment associated with labor hoarding resulted in low labor productivity in
CPEs (Ray, 1991).
For example, Party members and the Nomenklatura were frequently granted access to western
products and other goods in short supply.
One of the primary arguments for the retention of the EWT in Russia in the recent past was
that it compressed the income distribution and limited the growth in disposable income (Tait
and Erbas, 1995). See also Marrese (1994).
The unofficial economy in the Soviet Union apparently grew significantly over a period of
the last thirty years.
For a discussion of the strategies and problems related to transitioning fiscal and economic
policy, see Shome and Escolano (1993), OECD (1991a, b), Tanzi (1992), and Go (1994).
These choices at the beginning of the transition might be categorized by what Feldstein (1976)
calls “tax design," or instituting a system from scratch with no regard for the preexisting
conditions, and “tax reform,” which does take into account historical conditions.
A distinguishing characteristic of most CITs has been the relative importance in the economy
of large, state-owned conglomerates inherited from the previous regime. The size and impor
tance of these conglomerates have steadily shrunk as conversion and privatization have pro
ceeded. The presence of these large conglomerates, on the one hand, has dampened the
supply response to tax policies relative to that expected in market or even developing econo
mies (Kolodko, 1993). On the other hand, state enterprises have been more compliant (although
considerable arrears have commonly occurred) than the rapidly growing private sector, thus
providing an element of stability and continuity. It has been argued that this may not have
been totally negative during the transition. Successful tax enforcement of the most dynamic
sector could slow private initiative and growth. See Bogetic and Hillman (1994). Bahl and
Martinez-Vazquez (1992) raise similar issues for the case of developing countries.
A modem westem-style global personal income tax should be introduced much later in the
reform process.
McLure (1991b) also advocated the adoption in CITs of the simplified alternative tax (SAT),
a form of cash-flow tax.
See, for example, Boskin and McLure (1990), Owens (1991b), and Tanzi (1994).
There was also an evolution of emphasis on equity in the 1960s to neutrality in the 1980s
(McLure 1989).
For example, Hussain and Stem (1993) make the point that the taxation of intermediate goods
may be temporarily desirable in CITs to compensate for existing distortions and as a way to
bring into the tax net self-employed and small firms, which might otherwise escape taxation.
We have also seen that in the same vein Shome and Escolano (1993) recommended the
temporary use of EWTs and export duties or high import tariffs.
For a discussion of tax policy in developing countries, see Bird (1992), Boskin and McLure
(1990), Burgess and Stem (1993), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah (1991), Thirsk (1990), and
Newberry and Stem (1987). For a review of tax administration issues in developing countries,
see Bird and Casanegra (1992).
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Property and natural resource taxes are not included in the discussion due to the lack of
sufficient information across CITs.
State enterprises also had access to other funds, in particular off-budget accounts. See, for
example, Le Houerou, Gold, and Katash (1994).
For a discussion of the role of property rights in transition economies, see Shleifer and Vishny
(1993).
These taxes are discussed below.
See, for example, McLure (1995b) for a critical look at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
Actually the general tax rate in Hungary is 13 percent, but an additional 23 percent is levied
on distributed profits. This reverses the normal use of split rates to achieve dividend relief,
such as in the case of Germany.
Three countries (Bulgaria, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) have a general rate of 40 percent.
Multiple tax rates differing by type of enterprise and economic sector were not uncommon
until recently. For example, in Bulgaria in 1993, state (controlled by the central government)
enterprise profits were taxed at a rate of 52 percent and municipal enterprises were taxed at
a rate of 42 percent (Bogetic and Hillman, 1994). Additional levies existed on profitable
enterprises. Commercial banks, all state owned, were taxed at a rate of 50 percent, except for
the State Savings Bank, which was taxed at a rate of 70 percent. Private enterprises and foreign
ventures were generally taxed at lower rates, and rates vary with the level of profit and with
ownership composition. In Uzbekistan, until recent reforms, while the rate was officially set
at 18 percent, it varied from 3 percent to 60 percent, depending on the economic sector and
the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers.
In a few areas, the enterprise profit tax in CITs can be more generous than is common in
western countries. For example, it is common in CITs to allow enterprises a deduction for
reserves against bad debts and other contingencies for all types of enterprises and not just
insurance companies and other financial institutions as is more commonly the case in western
countries. These more generous provisions may be justified by the much higher incidence of
bad debts in CITs, however.
Croatia appears to be the only country that allows the adjustment of loss carry-forward for
inflation. In the case of assets, losses can be reevaluated each year at the industrial inflation
rate plus an opportunity cost of 3 percent.
Romania has been considering the introduction of a Chilean-type system of inflation adjustment.
Croatia's “protective interest deduction" is similar to the “allowance for corporate equity” (ACE)
proposed by Devereux and Freeman (1991). In Croatia, interest and dividend income are
exempt, and no other adjustments for inflation are provided in the enterprise income tax. The
reforms in Croatia were spearheaded by a team of German advisors led by Manfred Rose. See
Martinez-Vazquez (1995).
In reality, many countries allow a variety of methods, and several restrict them to historic
costs and/or weighted average costs.
See Shome and Escolano (1993) for a discussion of early depreciation measures, at times rather
unconventional, in the Central Asian CITs. McLure (1995a) reports that Kazakhstan adopted
a pooled asset account system for depreciation. There are concerns over whether or not
depreciation allowances on these bases (historic costs and straight line) have been adequate
for capital replacement (Tanzi, 1994).
The extent of tax incentives and special provisions, of course, varies across CITs. Hungary
still has the most complex system, leading some observers to call it a “Swiss cheese tax"
(McLure, 1995b).
See Shah (1995) for a review of these experiences.
Examples are Estonia, Romania, and to a lesser extent, Slovenia.
Countries with this type of provision include Georgia, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Kyrgizstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
This is practiced in Croatia (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995).
Up to 1995, presidential decrees were often used in the Russian Federation to grant tax benefits
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to entire sectors (e.g., the energy sector) and specific individual enterprises (e.g., the Zil
automobile company in Moscow, OECD, 1995b).
This has been the case in Ukraine, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and for
the most pan Kazakhstan.
These general tax holidays are more costly and not more effective than targeted investment
incentives. See, for example, McLure (1997).
For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Slemrod (1995).
The taxation of foreign income made by nationals abroad is a less important question for CITs
for the time being.
If the home country employs a territorial system (it taxes only income earned at home) tax
incentive to foreign investors in the host country can be as effective as those offered to domestic
investors. If the home country taxes global income but gives a credit for foreign taxes, CIT
incentives to foreign companies are equivalent to a transfer of CIT funds to foreign treasuries.
This transfer does not occur, however, if the foreign investor is in an "excess credit" position
(foreign credits exceed the tax that would be paid on the same income in the home country).
It is not uncommon for corporations in countries subject to a universal taxation to be in an
excess credit position in their home country. Tax incentives offered to foreign investors from
home countries with worldwide taxation may also be effective if the home country allows the
“deferral” of repatriation of profits or has signed a tax treaty with the host country with a “tax
sparing” clause. This latter allows credits for the taxes that would have been paid if the host
country did not provide the tax incentive. See Slemrod (1995).
The exceptions are Croatia, Lithuania, and Albania.
See Tait (1988) and Flanagan (1992). Many CITs have experimented with other forms of TIPs
to control the internal wage bill of state enterprises.
The United States ratified a tax treaty with Kazakstan in late 1996. This would not have
happened with the EWT in effect, since an income tax that does not allow deduction for
wages is not eligible for foreign tax credits in the United States.
An EWT in combination with the standard profit tax can approximate the base of the VAT
levied upon the full income of the enterprise. Tanzi (1991) makes this observation with respect
to the Russian EWT, which was repealed in 1996.
The transition problems associated with the introduction of a cash-flow income tax would
have been less pronounced in CITs because of the smaller amount of undepreciated capital
in the economy and less outstanding debt. The less pronounced differences in the distribution
of income may also have been a positive factor for the adoption of a consumption approach
to income taxes in CITs, however, CITs still would have been subject to the uncertainty of
whether the United States, and perhaps other countries with global income taxes, would have
allowed foreign tax credits for cash flow taxes paid in CITs. For a discussion of the general
issues, see McLure (1992), and of the crediting issue, see McLure and Zodrow (1995, 1996b).
Latvia and Lithuania also exempt all capital gains. Croatia only exempts capital gains from
immovable property held for over three years, and Albania has no provisions concerning
capital gains.
The failure to mesh individual and company taxes creates significant opportunities for tax
arbitrage. This is the case, for example, when there is no tax on interest income and interest
costs are allowed as a deduction.
This has been a repeated prescription for income tax reform in CITs. See, for example, McLure
(1991a) and Tanzi (1991).
CITs with final withholding taxes on dividend income include Belarus, Czech Republic, Hun
gary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Turkmenistan. The use of final
withholding taxes is less common for interest income (Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Slovak
Republic) and for some types of interest (Poland and Estonia) and royalties (Albania).
Such is the case, for example, in Bulgaria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Russia.
The inspiration for the new legislation came from multiple sources, not the least of which is
Hussey and Lubick (1995).
There may have also been an incentive during the transition to switch compensation from

958

72.

73.

74.
75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

81.

82.
8384.
85.
86.
87.

M a r t in e z -Va z q u e z

and

M c Nab

money wages to fringe benefits because of the high burdens on labor income implied by
“excess wage taxes” and rather steep payroll and social security taxes, discussed below. Le
Houerou, Gold, and Katash (1994), however, found little evidence of this type of switching
in the Russian Federation up to the end of 1993.
Hungary taxes cash fringe benefits at the individual level, but all fringe benefits are taxed at
the company level at a rate of 44 percent. The highest individual marginal rate in Hungary is
48 percent.
This is an approach openly used in Bulgaria and Poland. Most CITs also disallow or limit
travel and entertainment expenses and other selected categories of expenses which can possibly
be used to the nonbusiness-related benefit of employees and managers.
It is common not to allow as a deduction the contributions to pensions or the payroll taxes
paid by employees.
Personal and dependent allowances are defined in some CITs in terms of monthly minimum
wages, such as in the case of the Central Asian CITs, Lithuania, and Moldova, or in terms of
personal allowances, as in the case of Croatia. In Poland, children’s allowances are paid directly
to mothers and there is no provision in the personal income tax (PIT) code for this deduction.
In Latvia, taxable income up to 60,000 lats (approximately $115,000) is subject to a single rate
of 25 percent, and income over that amount is subject to a rate of 10 percent.
Over one-third of the CITs have this top rate.
No information is available on what percentage of taxpayers is subject to the top rates. In
most OECD countries only a small percentage of taxpayers is subject to the top rates.
In the early years of the transition, observers feared that inherited socialist values would lead
CITs to put undue emphasis on the goal of equalization and distribution. Even though many
CITs first introduced substantially higher marginal rates, the trend in the continued reforms
has been toward more moderate rates.
The use of minimum wages for this purpose has been a common practice in many I.atin
American countries which have been subject to rapid inflation over the past two decades and
decided not to use a full indexation approach for inflation. There is no uniform practice in
OECD countries with respect to the automatic (full or partial) indexation for inflation of
personal allowances, minimum exempt thresholds, or tax rate brackets. There are countries
that have used both indexation and ad hoc discretionary changes, and some have switched
from one system to the other.
See, for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) and Messere (1995). To avoid double
taxation, measures can be taken at the individual taxpayer level or at the company level. At
the individual taxpayer level shareholder relief may be granted by exempting or partially
exempting dividends or by attempting to integrate both taxes. This latter approach involves
imputation methods that tax the dividends at the personal level but give full or partial credit
for the tax that give relief at the company level are less commonly used because company
income taxes are used as withholding taxes for the harder to tax individual incomes. Relief
at the company level can be provided by granting lower tax rates for distributed profits or by
granting a deduction (partial or in full) for the distributed profits. One of the advantages of
consumption-based cash-flow taxes is that they generally do not require integration because
dividends are exempt.
This is the case in Russia and smaller FSU countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Bulgaria.
This is the case of Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Slovak Repub
lic, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.
This is the case in Serbia and Slovenia.
These are Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Serbia, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, and
Albania.
Lithuania and Turkmenistan with 31 percent, Kazakhstan with 32 percent, and Estonia with
33 percent.
Other choices of sales taxes, such as a multiple-stage turnover tax or even a single-stage sales
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lax at the production and wholesale levels, probably were inferior choices because of the
arbitrary effective taxation across sectors and their undesirable economic effects. These general
issues are discussed in many sources; Shome and Escolano (1993) and Summers and Sunley
(1995) provide the most extensive discussions of indirect taxation and the VAT in CITs.
It is necessary, however, to have effective border controls at least for products that can be
consumed by households. As we see below, the lack of border controls within most of the
FSU has heavily influenced the nature of the VAT adopted.
CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, which comprises Russia and all other
former Soviet republics except for the Baltic countries.
See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
Some CIS countries have in the recent past embarked upon comprehensive independent
reform efforts; this has been the case, for example, in Kazakhstan (McLure, 1995a).
The choice of this high rate of 28 percent was driven by the short-term objective of matching
the revenues collected with the old turnover tax. This may say, if computations were correct,
that the rates of the old turnover tax were quite high or that there was some degree of cascading
associated with the old turnover tax. After a few months, a lower rate of 15 percent was
introduced in Russia for most foodstuffs. Uzbekistan originally adopted a rate of 30 percent.
Belarus used a subtraction method VAT at all levels (Bird, 1995). In all CIS countries, there
were problems with the definition or measurement of the margin. Supposedly, the margin is
the firm’s markup or the difference between the price paid for the goods and the price at
which they are sold. The practice in CIS countries at the beginning of the transition is reviewed
in Shome and Escolano (1993).
This presumably encouraged self-construction.
Russia and the rest of the CIS countries also use a destination method for trade outside the
CIS.
The common base for imports for VATs in the EU is customs value plus the tariff plus any
excises that may apply. This is the base for imports commonly adopted in CITs in Central and
Eastern Europe. Some CIS countries use a base that includes only customs value (e.g., Georgia
and Azerbaijan), customs value plus tariff (e.g., Ukraine), or customs value, tariff, and excises
(e.g., Russia and Uzbekistan).
Tait (1988) provides an interesting discussion of the difficult choices to be made by CITs
concerning VAT exemptions.
The effect of preretail exemptions, including those for small businesses, differs under the
credit method and the subtraction method. Taxes are higher under the credit method. See,
for example, McLure (1987).
However, there is less clear justification for taxing other commodities at these lower rates.
For example, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all tax hotel services at reduced rates.
Other forms of indirect taxation exist, but they are not reviewed here. For example, Kazakhstan
levies a securities transaction tax on new issues of nongovernmental securities, including
stocks and bonds, and on secondary transactions of these same securities (McLure, 1995a).
For example, a presidential decree in Belarus in August 1996 raised levies on all imports from
10 to 150 percent and established that 75 percent of the goods on sale in Belarusian stores
must be domestically produced goods (Tax Notes International, 1996).
See Section III and also Tanzi (1993, 1991); Bakes (1991); Gray (1991); and Bahl and Wallace
(1995).
Go (1994) reports decreases as percentages of GDP from 60.2 percent (1987) to 34.2 percent
(1991) in Bulgaria, from 61.5 percent (1988) to 52.9 percent (1991) in Hungary, from 48.0
percent (1988) to 29.2 percent (1991) in Poland, and from 51.1 percent (1989) to 40.1 percent
(1991) in Romania.
These declines in revenues continue in many of these countries in more recent years. See,
for example, Khankevich (1996) and Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri (1995).
Some of these issues are discussed in Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri (1995) and Shome and
Escolano (1993).
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For example, Khankevich (1996) estimates that there were ten major structural changes and
over 100 modifications to the Belarusian tax system between 1992 and 1996.
See McLure (1995b) for surveys of taxpayers.
The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic acknowledge that deliberate and inadvertent
tax evasion may occur in 20 to 25 percent of all cases. See McLure (1995b) and Summers and
Sunley (1995).
The new tax code for Kazakhstan, which contained both tax policy and tax administration
measures, is an exception to this pattern. Even in this case, however, there was little or no
preparation for tax administrators or education for taxpayers (McLure, 1995a) McLure, MartinezVazquez and Wallace (1997).
Typically, a preparation of twelve to eighteen months is the minimum recommended for a
new VAT. See, for example, Tait (1988). The following anecdote provided by McLure (1995b)
illustrates this point. “In early 1992 a prominent member of the Russian Parliament told Dr.
McLure that Gaidar had told him at a reception one night in late 1991 that the VAT was going
to be introduced. The member asked Gaidar if the tax administration could handle it. Gaidar
responded affirmatively. Later the same night Lazarev (head of the lax service) told the member
that Gaidar had subsequently asked him whether the tax service could implement the VAT.
Even though Lazarev responded negatively, the VAT was introduced."
This is in contrast to the experience of nontransition countries, which typically have experi
enced unexpected increases in revenue as a consequence of the introduction of the VAT (Tait,
1988).
In Hungary, the ratio of profits tax relief to collected profits tax revenues rose from 17 percent
in 1989 to 26 percent in 1991 and reached 36 percent in 1993 (Semjen, 1995). During 1994,
it was estimated that the Russian Federation did forego up to 2.5 percent of GDP in tax
expenditures (OECD, 1995a).
Such countries as Belarus that lagged behind in tax reform and insisted on the applicability
of the old accounting system may have had the advantage of avoiding the confusion and
revenue consequences of adopting new taxes without having changed the accounting systems
(Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
See Kamite and Dovladbekova (1995).
See McLure (1995b) for surveys in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and de Melo
and Ofer (1994) for Russia.
The practice has been for enterprises to set separate trading firms and then use appropriate
pricing to transfer most profits to the artificial firm, which may not be registered at all with
the tax authorities. This practice is a version of western practices of shifting income to tax
haven countries and similar to what is known in U.S. interstate corporate income taxation as
the “Delaware company” avoidance problem. This involves attempts by corporations to shift
their profits to artificial or shell companies in states in which these companies are lightly taxed,
such as Delaware, or to companies in states with no corporate income tax, such as Nevada.
Many states eliminate this problem by combining the income and apportionment factors of
related corporations deemed to be engaged in a unitary business.
This appears to be happening in Russia. Semjen (1995) indicates this is also a practice in
Hungary.
In Kazakhstan the new tax code prohibits tax administration staff to work for other organizations
and to carry official duties for taxpayers about whom a conflict of interest may arise McLure,
Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (1997).
Dual subordination of tax officials and other issues related to the control o f employees in
deconcentrated offices are discussed below.
With international technical assistance, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and others have ongoing
pilot projects for the reorganization of the tax administrations along functional lines.
For example, in 1994, the main office of the Belarusian state tax inspectorate had only 135 employ
ees, of whom forty-four were in separate investigative services (Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
In Russia and other CIS countries, taxpayers still write separate checks to each level of govern
ment sharing revenues of a particular tax. Often, there are differences in the rate of payment
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to each level of government, but sometimes what appears to be better collection rates for
local and regional governments is simply due to the fact that taxpayers can more easily afford
to pay the lower rates they owe to local governments. The practice of writing separate checks
increases the compliance costs for taxpayers, but it endures because subnational governments
mistrust the central government’s willingness and ability to hand over funds once it has them.
These issues have been discussed frequently in the literature on intergovernmental fiscal
relations in CITs. See Bird, Ebel, and Wallich, 1995; Wallich, 1994; Martinez-Vazquez and
Boex, 1996b) McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1997).
There have been exceptions to the lack of adequate preparation, such as Kazakstan’s reform
in 1994 and the new tax code under preparation in Russia.
The adoption of a VAT in Bulgaria is an example.
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